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JURY NULLIFICATION: THE RIGHT
TO SAY NO
ALAN W. SCHEFLIN*
Only one of the countless historical trials held at the Old Bailey in Lon-
don -is commemorated by a memorial in the present building. On a
plaque near Court No. 5 are inscribed these words:
Near this site William Penn and William Mead were tried in
1670 for preaching to an unlawful assembly in Gracechurch Street.
This tablet commemorates the courage and endurance of the
Jury, Thomas Vere, Edward Bushell and ten others, who refused
to give a verdict against them although they were locked up with-
out food for two nights and were fined for their final verdict of Not
Guilty.
The case of these jurymen was reviewed on a writ of Habeas
Corpus and Chief Justice Vaughan delivered the opinion of the
court which established the Right of Juries to give their Verdict
according to their conviction.'
Al of the jurors in that celebrated case were fined and jailed until they
,paid their fines in full. Four of them spent months in prison and all
were locked up without "meat, drink, fire and tobacco" for three days
in an attempt to force them to change their verdict. Their courage,
fortitude and dedication to the spirit of liberty has been institu-
tionalized in our legal system under the doctrine of jury nullification.
According to this doctrine, the jurors have the inherent right to
set aside the instructions of the judge and to reach a verdict of acquittal
based upon their own consciences, and fhe defendant has the right to
have the jury so instructed. The jury nullification concept did not
develop as a pure question but instead was intermixed with other issues.
Thus, some of the ensuing discussion deals with the right of the jury
to decide questions of law as well as of fact. This issue raises the ques-
0 Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1963, Uni-
versity of Virginia; J.D. 1966, George Washington University; LL.M. 1967, Harvard Uni-
versity. Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center,
1971-72.
1. The case is Bushell's Case, 6 HowErL's STATE TRALus 999 (1670) [hereinafter cited
as HowEL's].
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tion of whether the jury can rule on the constitutionality of statutes.
For the sake of clarity, however, the jury nullification concept advocated
here is the right of the jury to be told by the judge that they may refuse
to apply the law, as it is given to them by the judge, to the defendant if
in good conscience they believe that the defendant should be acquitted.2
This paper will examine the nullification doctrine from its heyday
during the 18th century to its non-recognition by courts today. An
argument advanced for the right of both the defendant and the jurors
to the nullification instruction will be grounded upon the role of the
jury in a constitutional democracy.
I. JURY NULLIFICATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE3
There was a time when "conscience" played a legally recognized and
significant role in jury deliberations. Lord Hale, discussing the func-
tion of the jury in 1665, stressed the fact that ". . . it is the conscience
of the jury, that must pronounce the prisoner guilty or not guilty."4
In 1680, Sir John Hawles defended the right of jurors to judge both
law and fact in a criminal case:
To say that they are not at all to meddle with, or have respect to,
law in giving their verdicts, is not only a false position, and contra-
dicted by every day's experience; but also a very dangerous and
pernicious one; tending to defeat the principal end of the institu-
tion of juries, and so subtly to undermine that which was too strong
to be battered down.5
The increased use by the English government of prosecutions for
seditious libel in the 18th century as a means of silencing political foes
2. When the historical basis of jury nullification is dealt with, it is essential ini-
tially to pose the issue in broader terms since the right of the jury to decide questions of
law of necessity contains the lesser integral right to nullify. This broader right to decide
questions of law has occasionally been argued to include the right of the jury to declare
a statute unconstitutional-an extension which seems invalid. The jury may feel that the
statute is unconstitutional and refuse to -onvict under it (nullify), but it is absurd to
think that-they could declare a statute unconstitutional and have that decision be legally
binding in other cases. It seems likely, therefore, that all the argument means is that the
jury can nullify because they in good conscience believe the law is wrong. Similarly, if the
right to nullify, as it is advocated here, is recognized, it is not necessary to give the jury
the broader right to determine the law as weil as the facts. Thus, it is quite possible to
disapprove of the broader right without also disapproving of -the nullification right.
3. : I have drawn heavily on the excellent brief of Caroline Nickerson, Esq., in United
States v. Bernard E. Meyers, Criminal No. 872-69 (D.D.C. 1970).
4. 2 M. HALE, HTroRY oF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 312 (W. Stokes & E. Ingersoll
ed, 1847.), -
5. J. HAWEas, THE ENGLISHMEN'S RIGHT OR A DIALOGUE BETW EN A BARRISTER AT- LAW
AND A JURY M4AN 80 (reprinted Phila. 1-798). -
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gave rise to a great debate as to the extent of the role of juries in those
cases.6 Under the law of libel as it then existed, truth was not a defense.
In addition, judges left to the jury only the issue of whether there was
a publication by the defendant. With this view of the power of the jury,
prosecutions for seditious libel provided an excellent device for repres-
sion of dissent. With an agreeable, or at least neutral, judge, with truth
not a defense, and with a jury rubber-stamping the fact of publication,
which was usually not contested by the defendant anyway, convictions
were routine. Were it not for some courageous jurors who were willing
to put their lives on the line and decide political cases upon their own
consciences, the law of seditious libel might have prevented the birth
of our constitutional democracy by silencing all voices raised in protest.
Certainly freedom of speech and press would only have meant the
inalienable right to publicly agree with the government.
Consider the courage of the jury that tried William Penn.7 Penn
and Mead were indicted in 1670 for preaching before an unlawful
assembly. After hearing the evidence, the jury retired to consider its
verdict. Within an hour and a half, eight jurors returned to convict but
four refused to return to court until ordered to do so. The jury was
threatened by the court and sent back for further deliberations. When
they returned they found Penn guilty of speaking at Gracechurch Street
but refused to say whether he had been addressing an unlawful as-
sembly. Sent back again, they returned with a verdict of not guilty for
Mead and guilty of preaching to an assembly for Penn. The Recorder
then addressed them:
Gentlemen, you shall not be dismissed till we have a verdict
that the court will accept; and you shall be locked up, without
meat, drink, fire, and tobacco; you shall not think thus to abuse the
court; we will have a verdict by the help of God, or you shall starve
for it.
Penn: My jury, who are my judges, ought not to be thus
menaced; their verdict should be free, and not compelled; the
bench ought to wait upon them, but not forestal them. I do desire
that justice may be done me, and that the arbitrary resolves of the
bench may not be made the measure of my jury's verdict.
6. On seditious libel see 2 J. STErHENs, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL L&w oF ENGLAND
(1st ed. 1883); Shientag, From Seditious Libel to Freedom of the Press, 11 BRooKLYN L.
REv. 131 (1941); Kelly, Criminal Libel and Free Speech, 6 KANSAS L. Rzv. 295 (1958); L.
Levy, FREEDoM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: LEGACY oF SUPPRESSION
(1963).
7. Penn & Meads' Case, 6 HowElr's 951 (1670).
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Recorder: Stop that prating fellow's mouth, or put him out
of the court 8
Once again the jury was sent out and once again they returned
with the same verdict. After threats by the court failed to move them,
Penn spoke up:
Penn: It is intolerable that the jury should be thus menaced:
is this according to the fundamental laws? Are not they my proper
judges by the Great Charter of England? What hope is there of ever
having justice done, when juries are threatened, and their verdicts
rejected? I am concerned to speak, and grieved to see such arbitrary
proceedings. Did not the lieutenant of the Tower render one of
them worse than a felon? And do you not plainly seem to condemn
such for factious fellows, who answer not your ends? Unhappy are
those juries who are threatened to be fined, and starved, and ruined,
if they give not in verdicts contrary to their consciences.
Recorder: My Lord, you must take a course with that same
fellow.
Mayor: Stop his mouth; gaoler, bring fetters, and stake him
to the ground.
Penn: Do your pleasure, I matter not your fetters.
Recorder: Till now I never understood the reason of the
policy and prudence of the Spaniards, in suffering the inquisition
among them; and certainly it will never be well with us, till some-
thing like unto the Spanish inquisition be in England.9
When the jury was ordered to retire one more time, Bushell, the
foreman, objected by saying: "We have given in our verdict, and we all
agreed to it; and if we give in another, it will be a force upon us to save
our lives."'10 Nevertheless, they ultimately acquitted both defendants
even though the Court polled them individually.
Recorder: I am sorry, gentlemen, you have followed your
own judgments and opinions, rather than the good and wholesome
advice which was given you; God keep my life out of your hands;
but for this the court fines you 40 marks a man; and imprisonment
till paid.
Upon this Penn came forward, and said: I demand my liberty,
being freed by the jury.
8. Id. at 963.
9. Id. at 966.
10. Id.
1972]
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Mayor: No, you are in for your fines.
Penn: Fines, for what?
Mayor: For contempt of Court. 1
Upon a habeas corpus petition for release from prison, Bushell and
his fellow jurors were vindicated by a decision concurred in by all the
judges of England, except one, abolishing the practice of punishing
juries for their verdicts. 12 Chief Justice Vaughan of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas made it clear that
They [the jury] resolve both law and fact complicately, and not the
fact by itself; so as though they answer not singly to the question
of what is the law, yet they determine the law in all matters, where
it is joined and tried in the principle case, but where the verdict is
special.' 3
Vaughan felt that if the jury returned a verdict contrary to their con-
sciences they would be in violation of their oaths:
A man cannot see by another's eye, nor hear by another's ear; no
more can a man conclude or infer the thing to be resolved by
another's understanding or .reasoning; and though the verdict be
right the jury give, yet they, not being assured it is so from their
own understanding, are forsworn, at least foro conscientiae.1 4
The Penn and Mead jury stand as a hallmark of democratic govern-
ment; a popular check on governmental tyranny and judicial servility.
Continuing this development, over a century later in 1783, was the
case of William Davis Shipley, Dean of St. Asaph's. Shipley was charged
with seditious libel. His attorney, Thomas Erskine, in a brilliant sum-
mation to the jury, argued that the rulings of the court (that the jury
could not consider justification but could only decide whether there
was in fact a publication, as to which there was no dispute) should not
be obeyed:
They therefore call upon you to pronounce that guilt, which they
forbid you to examine into. Thus without inquiry into the only
circumstance which can constitute guilt, and without meaning to
find the defendant guilty, you may be seduced into a judgment
which your consciences may revolt at, and your speech to the world
11. Id. at 967.
12. Bushell's Case, 6 HowELL's 999 (1670).
13. Id. at 1015-16.
14. Id. at 1011.
HeinOnline  -- 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 172 1972
JURY NULLIFICATION
deny-I shall-not agree that you are therefore bound to find the
defendant guilty unless you think so likewise.15
Erskine's position became the law of the land nine years later
when Fox's Libel Act gave the jury the authority to decide questions
of both law and fact.
As new attempts to control jury verdicts developed, greater acts of
conscience were demanded. Three trials of William Hone were held on
three consecutive days in December, 1817, for publication of three
works alleged to be blasphemous and libelous.' 6 Three times, three
different juries refused to convict despite the Court's instructions. One
juror during the first trial openly challenged the judge's ruling that a
certain item of evidence was irrelevant. A juror in the third trial stated
that he was prepared to die, if need be, "rather than pronounce a man
'guilty' who was manifestly persecuted, not for blasphemy or sedition,
but for exposing abuses which were eating into the very heart of the
nation."1u
In the British colonies, the role of the jury in criminal trials under-
went similar development. A New York jury in 1735, at the urging of
Andrew Hamilton, generally considered to be the foremost lawyer in
the Colonies, gave John Peter Zenger his freedom by saying "no" to
governmental repression of dissent. Zenger was the only printer in
New York who would print material not authorized by the British
mayor. He published the New York Weekly Journal, a newspaper de-
signed to expose some of the corruption among government officials.
All of the articles in the papers were unsigned; the only name on the
paper was that of its printer, Zenger. Although a grand jury convened
by the government refused to indict Zenger, he was arrested and charged
by information with seditious libel. Although Zenger did not write any
of the articles and it was not clear that he even agreed with their
content, had the jury followed the instructions of the court they would
have had to find him guilty.
Against this obstacle, Hamilton insisted that the jurors:
... have the right beyond all dispute to determine both the law
and the facts, and where they do not doubt of the law, they ought
to do so.' 8
15. Dean of St. Asaph's Case, 21 HowELL's 847 (1783).
16. THE THREE TRIALS OF WH.Lt HONE (Tegg. ed. 1876).
17. Id. at 215.
18. J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATION OF THE CASE AND) TRIAL OF JOHN PETR
ZENGER 99 (1963).
1972]
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He urged the jury "to see with their own eyes, to hear with their own
ears, and to make use of their consciences and understanding in judging
of the lives, liberties or estate of their fellow subjects." The closing
words of his summation to the jury are as vital today as they were when
they were uttered over 200 years ago:
[t]he question before the Court and you gentlemen of the jury, is
not of small or private concern, it is not the cause of a poor printer,
nor of New York alone, which you are now trying: Nol It may in its
consequence, affect every freeman that lives under a British govern-
ment on the main of America. It is the best cause, it is the cause of
liberty; and I make no doubt but your upright conduct this day will
not only entitle you to the love and esteem of your fellow citizens;
but every man who prefers freedom to a life of slavery will bless
and honor you as men who have baffled the attempt of tyranny;
and, by an impartial and uncorrupt verdict, have laid a noble
foundation for securing to ourselves, our posterity, and our neigh-
bors that to which nature and the laws of our country have given
us a right-the liberty-both of exposing and opposing arbitrary
power (in these parts of the world) at least, by speaking and writing
truth.19
In the United States, colonial juries regularly refused to enforce
the navigation acts designed by the British Parliament to channel all
Colonial trade through the mother country. Ships impounded by the
British for violating the acts were released by colonial juries, often in
open disregard of law and fact. In.response to this process of jury
nullification, the British established courts of vice-admiralty to handle
maritime cases, including those arising from violations of the navigation
acts. The leading characteristic of these courts was the absence of the
jury;: this resulted in great bitterness among the colonists and was one of
the major grievances which ultimately culminated in the American
Revolution.2 0
In the period immediately before the Revolution, jury nullification
in the broad sense had become an intregral part of the American judi-
cial system. The principle that juries could evaluate and decide ques-
tions of both fact and law was accepted by leading jurists of the period.21
John Adams, writing in his Diary for February 12, 1771, noted
19. Id.
20. C. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AmERICAN HISTORY passim (1934); H,
MILLER, THE CASE FOR LmERTY 163-202 (1965).
. 21. See Note, Powers and.Rights of JUries in QUINCY, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND
ADJUDGED IN THE MASSACHUSETS SUPERIOR CoURT OF JUDICATURE, 1761-1772.
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that the jury power to nullify the judge's instructions derives from the
general verdict itself, but if a judge's instructions run counter to funda-
mental constitutional principles
is a juror obliged to give his verdict generally, according to his
direction or even to the fact specially, and submit the law to the
court? Every man, of any feeling or conscience, 'will answer, no. It is
not only his right, but his duty, in that case to find the verdict ac-
cording to his own best understanding, judgment, and conscience,
though in direct opposition to the direction of the court. 22
Adams based this reasoning in part on the democratic principle that
"the common people.., should have as complete a control, as decisive
a negative, in every judgment of a court of judicature" as they have in
other decisions of government.2 At the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, this view of jury nullification prevailed.24 Without jury
nullification, as the Founding Fathers well knew, government by judge
(or through the judge by the rulers in power) became a distinct possi-
bility and had in fact been a reality. In the Zenger case, two lawyers
were held in contempt and ordered disbarred by the judge when they
argued that he should not sit because he held his office during the
King's "will and pleasure." The Court of Star Chamber was not too
distant in memory for the colonists to have forgotten the many perver-
sions perpetrated there in the name of justice and law.25 It was likely,
therefore, that the once unchecked, unresponsive power of the judge
would have been limited by the Founding Fathers through some method
of public control. One method chosen was the jury function most
closely guarded by the colonists: the power to say no to oppressive
authority.
After the adoption of the Constitution, the concept of the jury as
one of the people's most essential vanguards against political oppression
continued as an underlying principle in the American judicial system.
In Georgia v. Brailsford,26 a civil trial held in 1794 under the original
jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice John
Jay, after instructing the jury on the law and advising them that, as a
general rule, they should take the law from the court, went on to say:
22. 2 LiFE AN Wonxs oF JOHN ADAms 253-55 (C. F. Adams ed. 1856).
23. Id.
24. See Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J.
170 (1964).
25. See B. BArLYN, THE IDEOLOGicAL OmrIINS oF THE AMERICAN REVOLUnON 109 n.13
(1967).
26. 3 U.s. (3 DaU.) 1 (1794).
1972]
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[i]t must be observed that by the same" law, which recognized the
reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have, nevertheless, a
right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine
the law as well as the fact in controversy.27
Even the politically repressive Sedition Law of 1798 provided that in
prosecutions for seditious libels "the jury ivho shall try the cause shall
have a right to determine the law' and the fact, under the direction of
the court, as in other cases."28
At the trial of John Fries for treason in 1800, Justice Chase in-
structed the jury that in criminal cases juries were to judge both the
law and the facts. 29 Justice Chase appended this charge to the jury to
his answer in his own impeachment trial where he was accused of,
among other things, usurping the function of the jury by denying them
the right to decide the law.30
As the 19th century dawned, juries continued to display the inde-
pendence that had. established their libertarian role under colonial
rule. In 1808, for example, resistance to the hated Embargo Law led to
.the acquittal of a defendant in Massachusetts clearly guilty under the
terms of the act after a dramatic trial in which Samuel Dexter persisted
in arguing the unconstitutionality of the law to the jury despite the
court's order not to do so.3 '
27. Id. at 4.
28. 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
29. Case of Fries, 9 F. Gas. 924 (No. 5127) (C.C.D. Pa. 1800).
80. See generally Lillich, The Chase Impeachment, 4 AMER. J. oF LEGAL HIST. 49
(1960).
31. See SIGMA, REMINISCENCES OF SAMuEL DEXTER (1857):
After Judge Davis had decided that the law was constitutional . . . Mr. Dexter
persisted in arguing the question of constitutionality to the jury, notwithstanding
the remonstrances of the Bench. At length, Judge Davis, under some excitement,
and after repeated admonitions, said to Mr. Dexter, that if he again attempted to
raise that question to the jury, he should feel it his duty to commit him for
contempt of Court. A solemn pause insued, and all eyes were turned towards
Mr. Dexter. With great calmness of voice and manner, he requested a postpone-
ment of the cause until the following morning. The Judge assented .... On the
following morning, there was a full attendance of persons; anxious to witness the
result of this extraordinary collision between the advocate and the Judge ...
Mr. Dexter rose, and facing the bench, commenced his remarks by stating that
he.had slept poorly and had passed a night of great anxiety. He had reflected
very solemnly upon the occurrence of yesterday .... No man cherished a higher
respect for the legitimate authority of these tribunals before which he was
called to practice his profession; but he entertained no less respect for his moral
obligations'to his client .... He had arrived at the clear conviction that it was his
duty to argue the constitutional question to the jury . . . . and that he should
pr6ceed to, do so, regardless of any consequences.
For more detail, see J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSrrrUbTION § 1064 n.(a) (5th ed.
1891).
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In 1850 Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Law.making it a crime
to provide assistance to runaway slaves. Resistance to the law on moral
grounds was open and widespread among the most "respectable" ele-
ments of society.32 Prosecutions under the law were largely unsuccessful
because of the refusal of juries to convict.m
There is agreement among many commentators that the right of
the jury to decide questions of law and fact prevailed in this country
until the middle 1800's. 34 By the end of the century, however, the power
of the jury had been thoroughly decimated by a jealous judiciary eager
to exercise tighter controls over lay participants in the administration
of justice. As one commentator has noted, "The jury at the outset of
the century had been regarded as a mainstay of liberty and an integral
part of democratic government. Butby the end of the century the jury
had come to be seen as an outmoded and none-too-reliable institution
for resolving disputed questions of fact."35 Indirect emasculation of
the jury's right to nullify through procedural devices such as the di-
rected verdict, special interrogatories, detailed jury instructions and a
restricted reading of the law-fact dichotomy, occurred during this period
thereby effectuating a redistribution of legal power. The specific demise
of the nullification right, however, can be traced to four highly influ-
ential cases which virtually changed the law across the country.
The first case to seriously question the jury's authority over issues
of law was United States v. Battiste, 6 decided in 1835 by Justice Story.
Conceding that the jury had the de facto power to nullify the judge's
instructions, Story denied the jury had the moral right to do so:
If the jury were at liberty to settle the law for themselves, the effect
would be not only that the law itself would be most uncertain...
but in case of error there would be no remedy or redress by the
injured party, for the court would not have any right to review the
law as it had been settled by the jury. Every person accused as a
criminal has a right to be tried according to the law of the land,
32. See L. FREDMAN, TnE WmsE MNORTY 28-50 (1971):
Judge Theophilus Harrington of Vermont said that the only evidence of slave
ownership he would accept was a bill of sale from God Almighty. Benjamin Wade,
an Ohio judge in 1850, publicly declared he would never enforce the fugitive law.
Id. at 47.
33. Sax, Conscience and Anarchy: The Prosecution of War Resistors, 57 YAM Ruvxw
481 (June 1968).
34. See Howe, Juries As judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L. REv. 582 (1939); Everett
v. United States, 336 F.2 979,-984 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion of Jud"e.Wright).
35. Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YArs -L.J.
170, 192 (1964).
36. 24 F. Cas. 1042 (No. 14, 545) (C.C.D. Mass. 1835).
1972]
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and not by the law as a jury may understand it, or choose, from
wantonness or ignorance or accidental mistake, to interpret it.8z
Story was apparently reacting in Battiste to a fear that the jury might
convict an innocent defendant. Battiste was a sailor ona ship transport-
ing slaves. Under an 1820 statute the death penalty was levied against
any American citizen who seized a Negro or Mulatto with the intent of
enslaving him. Story decided as a matter of law that the statute would
not apply to mere sailors. His comments must therefore be understood
in light of his fear that the jury would act with vengeance rather than
with mercy38 Under modem rules of procedure such fears have been
accommodated by a system in which the judge is free to direct a verdict
of acquittal, set aside a conviction, or grant a new trial where the verdict
is contrary to the law or against the weight of the evidence.
Story also seemed to equate the constitutional right to be judged by
the law of the land with the right of the judge to say what the law is
when, in fact, he had framed an issue of law for the jury to decide and
then urged them to adopt his view. Notwithstanding this inconsistency,
the argument Story posits is circular. Since no further definition of
"law of the land" is given, it could just as easily include the right of
the jury to define such law as it could refer to the judge's right to do so.
Thus, the question to be decided is: who decides what the law of the
land is? Story's argument thus begs the question by presuming that the
judge, and not the jury, is the proper authority to make that deter-
mination.
The second case of importance was Commonwealth v. Porter" in
1845. The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Porter, Chief Justice Shaw
writing the opinion, held that the jury could not determine questions
of law. While the opinion reversed the trend of cases in Massachusetts,
its effect was somewhat limited by the conclusion that although the
judge was the final arbiter of the law, the defense lawyer could argue
law to the jury, presumably to give them a clearer view of it. After the
Porter decision was announced, popular opposition to its conclusion
developed. At the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1853, an
amendment was introduced to overrule its holding. Although the Con-
stitution was defeated by popular election two years later, a statute was
subsequently passed embodying the central aspects of the amendment.
37. Id. at 1043.
838. See Van-Dyke, The 'Jury as a Political Institution, THE CEN RE MAGAZINE 17
(Mar. 1970).
39. 10 Metc. 263 (1845).
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But it had a short life-span for in that same year the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, Chief Justice Shaw writing the opinion again, held,
despite obvious legislative intent to the contrary, that the statute merely
codified common law, as it was articulated in Porter, which recognized
the right of the jury to bring in a general verdict. 4 Thus, without being
held unconstitutional the statute was judicially vetoed. It is both
troubling and ironical that jury power, originally designed as a check
on judicial arbitrariness and despotism, should be diminished by just
such an act of the judiciary. Nevertheless, Justice Shaw's opinions were
highly influential with other courts seeking greater control over the
outcome of trials.
The third major case in this development was United States v.
Morris)4 1 decided in 1851. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Curtis,
sitting as a trial judge in a case involving the Fugitive Slave Act, in-
terrupted the defendant's dosing argument to reject his assertion that
the jury could determine matters of law and hold the Act unconstitu-
tional. Justice Curtis based his argument on the constitutional right to
trial by jury. He argued that this right, as well as the right to be tried
under the law of the land, would be subverted if juries all over the
country had the power to overrule precedents and hold statutes uncon-
stitutional. If they had the power to decide the law there was no pro-
tection from their arbitrary and harsh use of such power. Nor would
there be any one "law of the land." Public animosity could become the
rule of law, raising the specter of jury "lynching." The concept of jury
nullification being propounded here is not open to this objection be-
cause it simply requires an instruction to the jurors that they have the
authority to acquit the defendant if they, on the basis of conscience, do
not believe that the defendant should be convicted, even though the
judge's instructions leave no margin for acquittal.
The last, and most significant of these four cases was Sparf and
Hansen v. United States,42 decided in 1895. The case is a veritable
tour de force of prior law and theory on this question, culminating in
favor of a limited role for the jury. Sparf involved two sailors accused
of murder on the high seas. Under applicable federal laws, the jury
was given the power to find the defendants guilty of any lesser included
offense than the one charged in the indictment. However, the judge
instructed the jury that there was no evidence in the case to support a
40. Commonwealth v. Anthes, 5 Gray 185 (1855).
41. 26 F. Cas. 1323 (No. 15,815) (C.C.D. Mass. 1851).
42. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
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lesser charge and if they found a felonious killing, they must find it
to be murder. The jury interrupted its .deliberations to get further
instructions from the judge:
Juror: If we bring in a verdict of guilty, that is capital
punishment?
Court: Yes.
Juror: Then there is no other verdict we can bring in except
guilty or not guilty?
Court: In a proper case, a verdict for manslaughter may be
rendered . . . ; and even in this case you have the physical power
to do so; but as one of the tribunals of the country, a jury is ex-
pected to be governed by law, and the law it should receive from,
the court.
Juror: There has been a misunderstanding, amongst us. Now
it is clearly interpreted to us, and no doubt we can now agree on
certain facts.43
It appears that the jury was. seeking to avoid the harsh penalty
from a guilty-of-murder - decisi6n by returning a Verdict of man-
slaughter.44 But this they were forbidden to do by the judge. The
Supreme Court, in sustaining the trial judge's ruling, based its con-
clusion on a much broader framework than nullification:
Public and private safety alike would be in peril, if the
principle be established that juries in criminal cases may, of right,
disregard the law as expounded to them by the court and become a
law unto themselves. Under such a system, the principle function
of the judge would be to preside and keep order while jurymen,
untrained in the law, would determine questions affecting life,
liberty or property according to such legal principles as in their
judgment were applicable to the particular case being tried. If
because, generally speaking, it is. the function of the jury to deter-
43. Id. at 62 n.l:
44. In early 19th Century England there were approximately 280 capital offenses. The
refusal of juries to convict where they considered the penalty too harsh finally forced
changes in the law. H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsFL, THE AMERICAN JURY 310 (1966).
The Supreme Court has recently pointed out hour jury nullification can have a
profound influence on the law. The Court noted that, historically, juries refused to convict
where the death penalty was deemed to be too harsh;,
In order to meet the -problem of jury nullification, legislatures did not try, as
befdre; to refine further -tlie"efifltion,of c..-A.]aT Thiriddt. Inste~ii they adopted-
the method of forthrightly granting juries discretion which they had bieen exercis-
ing in fact. . %(",
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 199 (1971).
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mine the, guilt or innocence of the accused according to the evi-
dence, of the truth or weight of which they are to judge, the court
should be held bound to instruct them upon a point in respect to
which there was no evidence whatever, or to forbear stating what
the law is upon a given state of facts, the result would be that the
enforcement of the law against criminals and the protection of citi-
zens against unjust and groundless prosecutions, would depend
entirely upon juries uncontrolled by any settled, fixed, legal prin-
ciples. And if it be true that jurors in a criminal case are under no
legal obligation to take the law from the court, and may determine
for themselves what the law is, it necessarily results that counsel for
the accused may, of right, in the presence of both court and jury
contend that what the court declares to be the law applicable to the
case in hand is not the law, and, in support of his contention, read
to the jury the reports of adjudged cases and the view of elementary
writers.45
The Court in Sparf appears to have confused the issue of counsel's
right to argue the law to the jury with the issue of the jury's authority
to refuse to apply the law as defined by the judge's instructions. Because
(1) the administrative difficulties of allowing counsel to argue the law
to the jury and (2).the protection of the defendant provided by appel-
late review of the judge's instructions should argument from counsel be
prohibited, are both inapplicable to jury nullification, the Court should
not have so blithely intermixed the two issues. Further, because they
constitute independent issues, the Court's circular use of each as a part
of its argument against the other is unpersuasive absent a more thorough
examination of their merits.
II. NULLIFICATION AND DISCRETION
Proper understanding of the concept of jury nullification requires it to
be viewed as an exercise of discretion in the administration of law and
justice. Jury discretion in this context, may be a useful check on
prosecutorial indiscretion. No system of law can withstand the full
application of its principles untempered by considerations of justice,
fairness and mercy. Every technical violation of law cannot be punished
by a court structure that attempts to be just. As prosecutorial discretion
weeds out many of these marginal cases, jury discretion hopefully weeds
out the rest.
The justification for nullification was well articulated by Wigmore
almost half a century ago:
45. 156 U.S. at 101-02.
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Law and Justice are from time to time inevitably in conflict. That
is because law is a general rule (even the stated exceptions to the
rules are general exceptions); while justice is the fairness of this
precise case under all its circumstances. And as a rule of law only
takes account of broadly typical conditions, and is aimed at average
results, law and justice every so often do not coincide. Everybody
knows this, and can supply instances. But the trouble is that Law
cannot concede it. Law-the rule-must be enforced-the exact
terms of the rule, justice or no justice. "All Persons are Equal
before the Law"; this solemn injunction, in large letters is painted
on the wall over the judge's bench in every Italian court. So that
the judge must apply the law as he finds it alike for all. And not
even the general exceptions that the law itself may concede will
enable the judge to get down to the justice of the particular case,
in extreme instances. The whole basis of our general confidence
in the judge rests on our experience that we can rely on him for the
law as it is. But, this being so, the repeated instances of hardship
and injustice that are bound to occur in the judge's rulings will in
the long run injure that same public confidence in justice, and
bring odium on the law. We want justice, and we think we are
going to get it through 'the law' and when we do not, we blame
the law. Now this is where the jury comes in. The jury, in the
privacy of its retirement, adjusts the general rule of law to the
justice of the particular case. Thus the odium of inflexible rules
of law is avoided, and popular satisfaction is preserved. * 0 *
That is what jury trial does. It supplies that flexibility of legal rules
which is essential to justice and popular contentment. And that
flexibility could never be given by judge trial. The judge (as in a
chancery case) must write out his opinion declaring the law and the
findings of fact. He cannot in this public record deviate one jot
from those requirements. The jury, and the secrecy of the jury
room, are the indispensable elements in popular justice.40
"Jury lawlessness" according to Dean Roscoe Pound, "is the great
corrective" in the administration of law. 47 Thus, the jury stands be-
tween the will of the state and the will of the people as the last bastion
in law to avoid the barricades in the streets. To a large extent, the
jury gives to the judicial system a legitimacy it would otherwise not
possess. Judge control of jury verdicts would destroy that legitimacy.
46. Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of a Jury, 12 Am. JUD. SoC. 166 (1929).
4-7. Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44-Am. L. Rev. 12, 18-19 (1910):
If the ritual of charging the jury on the law with academic exactness is preserved,
the record will show that the case was decided according to law, and the fact that
-- the jury dealt with it according to extra-legal notions of conformity to the views
of the community for the time being, is covered up.
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A juror who is forced by the judge's instructions to convict a defen-
dant whose conduct he applauds, or at least feels is justifiable, will lose
respect for the legal system which forces him to reach such a result
against the dictates of his conscience. The concept of trial by a jury of
one's peers is emasculated by denying to the juror his right to act on the
basis of his personal morality. For if the jury is the "conscience of the
community,"48s how can it be denied the right to function accordingly?
A juror compelled to decide against his own judgment will rebel at the
system which made him a traitor to himself. No system can be worthy of
respect if it is based upon the necessity of forcing the compromise of a
man's principles. 49
48. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (Ist Cir. 1969).
49. It might be suggested that this argument can be used the other way-jury
nullification frustrates the wishes of other jurors who vote to convict. This argument is
really directed at the unanimity principle and only indirectly at jury nullification. In the
words of Judge Haralson:
A busy citizen is summoned into court: he hears the evidence in the case; and
with a majority of the jury he is clearly convinced that the law has been violated
or has not been violated. After his wearisome sitting on the jury he goes into
an even more tiresome deliberation with his fellow jurors. Although the majority,
or even all except several, have reached a conclusion, they find that there are
those among their number who do not concur with them. No amount of persua-
sion can change the situation. The few, unless they choose to do so, need not
even give a reason for their position. The jury reports to the judge that they
cannot agree. Hoping to avoid the trouble and expense of another trial, the judge
sends the jury back for further deliberation. But, sooner or later, in too many
instances, he is forced to enter a mistrial and discharge the jury. After the day's
work is over, some member of the jury, unable to restrain his feelings, will express
his resentment of the unanimous verdict. He thinks that his time and the tax-
payer's money is being wasted, which is true. He has a feeling of frustration and
is convinced of the hopelessness of ever enforcing any progressive legislation in
the face of such a system.
W. Haralson, Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases, 21 Miss. L.J. 185, 195 (1950).
Judge Haralson concludes that where the legislature by majority vote passes a law and
one person can prevent the law from being applied, this allows one juror (the minority)
to block the expressed will of the other 11 (the majority) and thus the "best efforts" of the
majority are thwarted contrary to principles of democracy.
The Justice Department has recently testified on behalf of legislation which would
allow convictions to stand in criminal cases where the jury is split 9-3. Wall St. J., Sept.
16, 1971, § 1, at 1. The Supreme Court will hear argument this term on this question with
regard to state law.
The error in Judge Haralson's thinking is that it views the jury as existing only to
work the will of the majority. The jury in fact exists to protect the minority from
majority oppression. The jury is a democratic institution not in terms of majority rule
but rather in terms of rule by the people over themselves. Such rule is subject to the
system of checks and balances which serves to prevent tyrannical use of power. Without
the requirement of a unanimous jury verdict, there would exist no protection for a
political or social minority. And, as Judge Holtzoff has pointed out, the requirement of
unanimity gives stronger assurance that the verdict is fair and just. Holtzoff, Modern
Trends in Trial by Jury, 16 WAsH. & LEE L. R v. 27 (1959). Of course, it should not be
forgotten that in the case of a hung jury there can always be a new trial so that the
"will of the majority" may be brought to bear on the defendant anyway.
1972]
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Jessica Mitford interviewed three jurors in the United States v.
Spock5 ° case after the trial's completion.51 She detected that theyhad
misgivings about the unfairness of the laws which they were asked to
apply. Though they all seemed to sympathize with the defendants, they
were concerned, in principle, about violations of law going unpunished.
Each one indicated that the conviction was necessary in light of the
instructions from the judge: "I knew they were guilty when we were
charged by the judge. I did not know prior to that time-I was in full
agreement with the defendants until we were charged by the judge.
That was the kiss of deathl 52 It is reasonable to conclude that if the
jury had been instructed of their power to nullify, the convictions might
not have been returned. However, these jurors felt bound by the judge's
instructions, even though they had prevlousfy decided the issue of guilt
in favor of the defendant. If they had been told that an.element of the
crime was that the jury in good conscience must feel that the law was
fair and was fairly applied, then they could have dispensed justice in
accordance with their conscientious beliefs.'Even if:this jury felt guilt-
less because they had done what was -reqilired of them, they should not
have felt comfortable about a system which may~have misused them for
political purposes.
If jury discretion. leads to a lawless society, as some critics of nullifi-
cation have argfied,- what does no disretigsi lead to?. Several years ago
the New York police went on "strike" on- the, L6ng.island Expressway
and ticketed every motorist failing to observe any traffic regulation
presently on the books. Though the police'did not ticket ndn-violators,
there was still a great outcry against. their conduct.s While much of
50. 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
51. J. MrrFoid, THE TRIAL OF DR. SPOCK 220-35 (1969).
52. Id. at 232. - -
53. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1968. The jury when it iullifies will not bedestroying
the law but simply exercising a discretion similar to that of the prosecutor.
in a representative government, there is no absurdity or contradiction, nor'
any arraying of the people against themselves, in requiring that the statutes ore actments of the government shall pass the ordeal of any number of separate
tribunals, before it shall be determined that they are to have the 0rec of laws.
Our American constitutions have provided five separate tritunols, to
wit, representatives, senate, executive, jury and judges; and hav made it necessary
that each enactment shall pass the ordeal of all these separate tribunals beforeits authority can be established by the punishment of those who choose to
transgress it. And there is no more absurdity or inconsistency in making, a jury
one of these several iribunals, then there is in making -the represeniatives, or the
senate, or the executive, or the judges, one, of them. .There; is, no Yndre absurdity %
in giving a jury a veto upon the laws, then there is in.giving a veto to ea~h of
these other tribunals. The people are no more arrayed -against themselves, when ,'
a jury puts its veto upon a statute, which'the other' tribunals have sanctlofied,
than they are when the same veto is exercised-by the representatives, the senate,
the executive, or the judge.
SPOONER, TRIAL aY JURY 11-12 (1852).
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the wrath was vented on the devious tactic used to get the raises, much
of it was also against the lack of discretion in the enforcement of the
laws. Without such discretion, the legal system becomes a mockery. 5
But unlimited discretion in the hands of persons in power can become
despotic. Accountability of such discretion to the people is the funda-
mental principle of democracy. It is also the underlying rationale for
jury nullification.55
III. DEMOCRACY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
Political systems may be approached, classified and analyzed according
to their methods of public policy formulation within the context of
value conflict. Every political system has "a more or less cohesive body
of principles on which it operates, and a body of normative beliefs to
justify it."' iG The United States, through its Constitution, is pledged
to organizational, structural, and procedural values which may unques-
tionably be labeled "democratic." Much of the Constitution may be
read as a catalogue of our commitments as a nation to a democratic
method of decision-making; a democratic method by which value con-
flicts are resolved.
"Democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of
institutional arrangement for arriving at political ...decisions and
hence incapable of being an end in itself. . .57 This is so regardless of
the particular decision arrived at under any given historical conditions.
Consequently, emphasis on democracy as a decision-making process
must be the starting point of any attempt to define or analyze it. The
common meaning of "democracy" is "government or rule by the people,
54. See generally K.L. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JusTicE (1969).
55. The fundamental principle of democracy-self-rule through the accountability of
government decision-making-justifies the existence of the jury as a check on both the
prosecutor and the judge. If the jury convicts, this decision itself is subject to a series of
checks and balances in terms of a motion for new trial and an appeal. In a sense then,
perhaps jury conviction is accountable to the procedures which protect defendants from
being held criminally liable where their constitutional or statutory rights have been
violated. Jury acquittal is a different matter. The jury is answerable to no one-it is not
accountable. This is not un-democratic, however. Since the democratic notion of ac-
countability relates to the right of the people to serve as a final check on the exercise of
government power, if the jury were accountable to the government this check would be
lost. Nor are the jury accountable to the rest of the community since the jurors themselves
constitute the community for the sake of the verdict they reach. But clearly the juries
are accountable to themselves and that is the basis of the nullification argument.
56. H. MAYO, AN INTRODUCMON TO DEMOCRATiC THEORY 11 (1960).
57. MAYo, supra note 56, at 33, quoting from J. SCHUMPTER, CAPM, I.SMs, SocIAlsm,
ANt DEmocRAcY 220 (1950).
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either directly or through elected representatives." 8 This definition re-
fers to a method of governing by specifying who rules, or, put another
way, who makes binding decisions in terms of value allocation within
the context of conflict resolution.5 9 Consequently, any examination of
a democratic system and its underlying values should be phrased in
terms of sovereignty, that is, in terms of who makes binding decisions,
or who should make them. This is particularly true in discussing the
role and function of juries with respect to their reflection, real or ap-
parent, of democratic values.
One of the most significant principles of democracy calls for the in-
volvement or participation of the "man in the street" in the formation
of public policy. Within the framework of the judicial process, the jury
has evolved as an institutional reflection of such a commitment. The
"man in the street" becomes the "man in the jury box,"60 and as such
sits as the representative of the community in question."1 As the em-
bodiment of the "conscience of the community"0 2 he functionally le-
58. Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, "Democracy," 890
(College Ed. 1966).
59. MAYo, supra note 56, at 23-24. It is important for this discussion that this original
notion of democracy be kept in mind by the reader, although, as the author recognizes,
to one individual "democracy" connotes a Christian society, to another, a society "with
liberty and justice for all," while to still others, an economic system of private enterprise.
There is, in fact, almost no end to such special meanings, which is reflective of the fact
that "democracy" is an honorific and persuasive word, or as Veblen would put it, a
"hurrah" word, rather than a "boo" word. Id.
60. P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MoRALs 21 (1965); "The man in the jury box
is not just an expression; he is an active reality. It will not in the long run work to make
laws about morality that are not acceptable to him."
61. See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 180 (1940) where the Court said, "It is
part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that
the jury be a body truly representative of the community"; Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 86 (1941) ("The officials charged with choosing federal jurors ... must not allow
the desire for competent jurors to lead them into selections which do not comport with the
concept of the jury as a cross-section of the community.'); and Green v. Alaska, 462 P.2d
994, 997 (Alaska, 1969) ("A jury under our constitution must be an 'impartial' one. This
is an expression of the notion of what a proper jury is-a body truly representative of
the community. Such a notion is in keeping with our basic, traditional concept of a
democratic society and representative government.'). Also see D. BAznLON, The Adversary
Process-Who Needs It?, 12th Annual James Madison Lecture, New York University
School of Law (April, 1971), reprinted in 117 CONG. REC. 5852, 5855 (daily ed. April 29,
1971): ". . . the jurors, as representatives of the community, have the opportunity to
inject into the proceedings at hand their sense of the standards that prevail in the
community." *
62. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 181 (Ist Cir. 1969) where it was held that:
The jury, as the conscience of the community, must be permitted to look at
more than logic ... If it were otherwise there would be no more reason why a
verdict should not be directed against a defendant in a criminal case than in a
civil one. The constitutional guarantees of due process and trial by jury kequire
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gitimizes and effectuates the authoritativeness of decisions made by and
through the judicial process.63
The chief distinguishing characteristic of any democratic system is
effective popular control over policymakers.64 With reference to the ju-
dicial process this can mean only one thing: If the "man in the jury
box" is to fulfill his role as the representative of the "conscience of the
community," participating effectively in the making of public policy,
then he must possess the power and the right to check the "misappli-
cation" of any particular value distribution. Beyond this, he must be
informed that he has such a power and the constitutional right to ex-
ercise it.
Lawrence Velvel argues that the notion of jury nullification is "a
kind of repository of grass roots democracy" since ordinary citizens can
effectively say no to their rulers when their policies and laws are no
longer in touch with the will of the people. 65 This argument is strength-
ened by examination of the fundamental justification for the jury. In
Duncan v. Louisiana,66 the Supreme Court interpreted the sixth amend-
ment right to trial by jury in these terms:
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to
prevent oppression by the Government. Those who wrote our con-
stitutions knew from history and experience that it was necessary to
protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate
enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher
authority. The framers of the constitutions strove to create an
independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection against
arbitrary action. Providing the accused with the right to be tried
by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased, or eccentric judge.... Fear of unchecked power, so typi-
cal of our State and Federal Governments in other respects, found
expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community
participation in the determination of guilt or innocence. 7
that a criminal defendant be afforded the full protection of a jury unfettered,
directly, or indirectly. [Emphasis added.]
63. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
64. MAYo, supra note 56, at 60.
65. L. VELVEL, UNDECLAPD WAR AND CivI. DISOBEDIENCE 215 (1970).
66. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
67. .d. at 155-56.
The purpose of the jury trial, as we noted in Duncan, is to prevent oppression
by the Government. "Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of
his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." ... Given this
purpose, the essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between
1972]
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As de Tocqueville observed over 100 years ago, "the jury is em-
phatically a political institution."' Some contemporary writers agree.6
As a political institution, the jury system has ".... developed in harmony
with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative
government."70 Through the jury as a political institution, the legal
system achieves legitimacy.
IV. THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY
The stability of any democracy, or for that matter, of any political sys-
tem, depends in the final analysis upon the effectiveness and legitimacy
of its institutions. 1 The distinguishing factor between the rule of law
and the rule of force is legitimation. The ability of a person in power,
or an institution which wields power, to justify his or its conduct, either
by reference to external standards of a higher morality or principle, or
by engendering public acceptance of the appropriateness of such power
and its use, is the measure of his or its legitimacy in the eyes of the
people.72 Legitimacy thus constitutes an "entitlement" to power.78 In
an article entitled Minority Rights and the Public Interest,7 4 Louis
Lusky describes the two main techniques for inducing obedience to
law: "One is to penalize intransigence so severely that potential law-
breakers are deterred by fear. The other is to foster in them a sense of
'political obligation,' with a view to obtaining their uncoerced obedi-
ence and support."7 5 In a country which prides itself on the use of the
the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen,
and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from
that group's determination of guilt or innocence.
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
68. 1 DE TocQuEVILL, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 284 (1945).
69. KALVEN & ZEiSEL, supra note 44, at 3; Van Dyke, supra note 38, at 17.
70. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942); cf. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1948).
71. S. LIPsEr, POLTCAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 64 (1960).
72. See the perceptive essay, Schaar, Legitimacy in the Modern State, in POWER AND
COMMUNrrY 276-327 (P. Green & S. Levinson eds. 1969).
73. Id. at 285.
74. Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1, 3-4 (1942).
75. Id. Judge Wyzanski's language in United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511 (D.
Mass. 1968) is well worth repeating:
When the state through its laws seeks to override reasonable moral commit.
ments it makes a dangerously uncharacteristic choice. The law grows from the
deposits of morality. Law and morality are, in turn, debtors and creditors of each
other. The law cannot be adequately enforced by courts alone, or by courts
supported merely by the police and the military.
The true secret of legal might lies in the habits of conscientious men disciplin-
ing themselves to obey the law they respect without the necessity of judicial and
administrative orders.
When the law treats a reasonable, conscientious act as a crime it subverts its
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latter technique, the institutions of government must find a way to
persuade the people to believe in its processes and accept its decisions
and laws even if those processes, decisions or laws appear at first blush
to be unwise, unjust or unfair. The only way for such obedience to be
obtained is by popular acceptance and respect for the decision-making
institutions themselves. In short, the governmental institutions must
have legitimacy in the eyes of the people in order to command respect
for their promulgations.
Ultimately, this means that institutions created for the purpose of
"authoritative decision-making" must abide by and be reflective of the
underlying principles which serve to explain and justify that system.
It is absolutely crucial for the political system to develop and retain
"the capacity to engender and maintain the belief that the existing
political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.""0
Participation by the members of society in the processes of govern-
ment legitimates that government and enhances its effectiveness. 7 Di-
rect election of legislators and lay participation on juries are both
central ingredients of a democrative theory that maintains the sover-
eignty of the people through self-government.78 The legitimacy of gov-
ernmental institutions is enhanced when the people themselves
participate in the formulation and application of laws.7 9
The judicial system is no exception to the requirements of par-
ticipation and accountability.8" Dale Broeder, a member of the Chicago
own power. It invites civil disobedience. It impairs the very habits which nourish
and preserve the law.
76. LipsEr, supra note 71.
77. I am indebted to Mr. Daniel Hickey for profitable discussions on many of these
ideas.
78. Webster's Dictionary defines "democracy" as "government or rule by the people,
either directly or through elected representatives." A democratic system must thereby guar-
antee the people effective popular control over policy-makers. This, in turn, legitimizes the
government.
79. [T]here can be no universal respect for law unless all Americans feel that
it is their law-that they have a stake in making it work. When large classes of
people are denied a role in the legal process-even if that denial is wholly unin-
tentioned or inadvertent-there is bound to be a sense of alienation from the
legal order.
Kaufman, A Fair Jury-The Essence of Justice, TRIAL LA WYERs FoRu 9, 20 (Mar.-Apr.
1968).
80. See J. Hupsr, TBm LEGrrIT ACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORAON 58 (1970):
What law permits or accepts, what it enforces or compels, should be socially
useful and socially responsible. These have been the prime elements in the de-
mand for legitimacy which has been an insistent theme in our legal order. Le-
gitimacy means that no arrangement of relations or of power recognized in law
should be treated as an end in itself or as autonomous. An institution must be
legitimated by its utility to some chosen end other than its own perpetuation.
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Jury Project studying the role of the jury in the United States, testified
before Congress on the data he had developed showing that jury service
"democratizes, serving as a constant reminder that each of us has a say
in the affairs of government." He said that the Negro jurors were over-
whelmed by their selections:
When I got my summons . . . I got a sense of really belonging to
the American community.... It was a very proud moment when
I opened my letter and found that I had been ... selected to serve
on a Federal jury.5 1
The lay jury does more than legitimize the judicial system. It
changes the values of that system.
Jury service should not, however, be viewed as mere catharsis for
the masses; lay participation is a creative process by which com-
munity standards are injected into the legal system to guard against
possible harshness, arbitrariness, or inaccuracy in the administra-
tion of justice.8 2
Thus, jury service is a two-way street. Community values are in-
jected into the legal system making the application of the law respon-
sive to the needs of the people,8 3 and participation on the jury gives
the people a feeling of greater involvement in their government which
further legitimizes that government. This dual aspect of the concept of
the jury, flowing from its role as a political institution in a constitu-
tional democracy, serves to keep both the government and the people
in touch with each other. But should there be a divergence of sufficient
magnitude, as the Founding Fathers were aware there often is, the jury
can serve as a corrective with a final veto power over judicial rigidity,
servility or tyranny.
An institution which wields practical power-which compels men's wills or be-
havior-must be accountable for its purposes and its performance by criteria not
wholly in the control of the institution itself. That legitimacy should derive from
utility expresses the pragmatism bred of our experience in opening up a raw con-
tinent, through generations in which we were under pressure to improvise and
make do with resources frustratingly short of the opportunities. That legitimacy
means responsibility---that an institution with power must be accountable to
some judgment other than that of the power holders--expresses the prime em-
phasis this culture puts on the individual as the ultimate measure of institu-
tions.
81. Testimony of Dale V. Broeder, Hearings on S. 383-87, 989 & 1319 Before the Sub.
comm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
90th Cong., Ist Sess. 61, 63 (1967) (quoting one such juror).
82. Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YAm L.J. 531 (1970).
83. As A.C.L.U. Southern Regional Director Charles Morgan, Jr., recently said:
"What juries will tolerate is what people in Communities will do." Rugabar, Southern
Juries: It Turns Out Different When the Peers are Black, in N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1968, § 4,
at 3.
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In the words of Thomas Jefferson, "Were I called upon to decide,
whether the people had best be omitted in the legislative or in the ju-
diciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the
legislative. The execution of the laws is more important than the mak-
ing of them." 84 The power of the people as a community conscience
check on governmental despotism is manifested in their ability to sit
on juries and limit the thrust of governmental abuse of discretion.
The necessity for jury nullification becomes especially crucial
when political trials are brought. 5 In ordinary criminal trials, prose-
cutorial discretion tempers harsh, though constitutional, laws and
forbears from instigating criminal violations not founded upon com-
munity support. In political trial situations, however, prosecutorial
discretion no longer acts as a buffer between the community and the
laws and thus the ordinary restraint exercised to prevent unfair prose-
cutions can no longer be counted upon. In cases where the government
itself is the victim, where the offense is the crime of challenge to the
authority of the rulers themselves, the community must exercise the
84. Letter from Jefferson to L'Abbe Arnoud, July 19, 1789, in 3 Woxs OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 81-82 (Wash. ed. 1854).
85. Most lawyers would agree with Louis Nizer that there is no such thing as a
political trial. Nizer, What to Do When the Judge is Put Up the Wall, N.Y. Times Mag.,
Sunday, Apr. 5, 1970. They would characterize the so-called political trial as merely a
criminal trial in which a defendant, or a group of defendants, is charged with the com-
mission of a crime defined by a duly enacted piece of legislation.
At the opposite extreme are those lawyers, and others, who maintain that every crim-
inal trial is political since it represents the ability of the administration in power to ex-
ercise its authority over an individual with the force of the state behind it. This argument
is particularly appealing when the defendant is poor, or black, or in some other way dis-
enfranchised. As Professor Anthony Amsterdam recently wrote,
Virtually every trial is a political trial when you look at it in a social con-
text. We operate at a time of gravest doubt of the potential of the political sys-
tem to deliver justice to anyone outside the mainstream. Thus, the trial of a poor
black in Detroit for a misdemeanor is a political trial where neither the judge,
jury, cop nor penal system is attuned to the life style of the defendant in any way.
Quoted in Navasky, Right On! With Lawyer William Kunstler, N.Y. Times Mag., Sunday,
Apr. 19, 1970, at 93. Thus, the definition of "political trial" is indeed elusive, capable of
encompassing all or none of the criminal prosecutions in this country. The possibilities
include: (1) any trial which will have political repercussions if the defendant is convicted;
(2) prosecutions of technically criminal activity when the state's motive is to suppress
political opposition; (3) prosecutions where the state has fabricated a case on traditional
criminal grounds but the primary motive for so doing is to silence a member of a po-
litical minority; and (4) trials involving political offenses such as treason, espionage, and
sedition. However, because this article does not suggest limiting nullification to "po-
litical" trials, it is unnecessary to define the term, or even to argue against the proposi-
tion that political trials do not exist. For discussion of these issues, see T. BECKER, Po-
LITICAL TRIALs (1971); J. SHELAR, LEGALISm (1964); 0. KRCHHIm.ER, POLMCAL JusncE; THE
USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR POLITICAL ENDS (1961).
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discretion normally residing in the office of the prosecutor. 0 This
power of the jury, most particularly in political cases, was so feared by
many governments during the 1800's that trial by jury was not allowed
where a political offense was involved.87 For example, Imperial Russia
began using the jury system in 1864 but at first did not extend it to
include political crimes. In 1871, however, 80 revolutionaries were
brought to trial-the first public trial of political enemies in the coun-
try. The jury acquitted over three-fourths of them and the verdict was
approved by the people. The Czar issued a secret order depriving those
found innocent of their rights as citizens and revamped the jury sys-
tem so that in political offense cases, the jury would be hand-picked by
the Czar's representatives. 88
Inherent in the concept of a lay jury composed of citizens who
leave their normal life patterns, meld into a decision-making unit for
the purposes of judging one of their number, and melt back into the
community, is the ability to say no and the knowledge that it cannot
be held against them. The jury serves as an ameliorating force temper-
ing the rigidity of the law, and of the professionals who administer it,
with the common sense realities of the community.8 0 In the criminal
case, no man may be convicted without the verdict of his peers. If crime
is unacceptable deviance from community values and standards, then
a community judgment on that deviance must be made. In a democ-
racy, people decide what is good for them, the government does not do
it for them.90
86. See Sax, supra note 33, at 487-88.
87. M. BLooMsTmm, VE, iar: THE JuRY SYsram 108-17 (1968). Examples include
Prussia, Spain and Russia in the 1800's.
88. Id. at 110.
89. .. . [T]he verdicts of juries [function] to check the execution of a cruel or
oppressive law, and in the end to repeal or modify the law itself ... thus, not
only are juries in fact the real judges . . . , but they possess a power no judge
would venture to exercise, namely, that of refusing to put the law in force....
It has been the cause of amending many bad laws which judges would have ad-
ministered with exact severity, and defended with professional bigotry.
RUSSELL, IsroRY OF THE ENGLiSH GOVERNMENT AND CONrTru~ioN, quoted in Sax, supra
note 33, at 486.
90. Charles Reich's article entitled, The Limits of Duty, which appeared in THE NEw
YoPma, June 19, 1971, is well worth reading in its entirety because of its attempt to
analyze the concept of duty in a technocracy. The excerpt which follows deals with the
government's response to the May Day demonstration in Washington, D.C. As Professor
Reich wrote:
.... Government by a managerial elite deprives us of the humanity of the many.
Policy is made by a few, and the rest are coerced into following by laws that
speak in the name of duty. The assumption is made that those who get to the top
are naturally qualified to manage and plan for the rest of us, that we must ac-
cept what they require of us without allowing our moral knowledge to intervene.
Such a neglect of our moral resources is as great a loss as our now well-known
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The jury provides an institutional mechanism for working out
matters of conscience within the legal system. Jury nullification allows
the community to say of a particular law that it is too oppressive or of
a particular prosecution that it is too punitive or of a particular de-
fendant that his conduct is too justified for the criminal sanction to
be imposed.
Unless the jury can exercise its community conscience role, our
judicial system will have become so inflexible that the effect may
well be a progressive radicalization of protest into channels that
will threaten the very continuance of the system itself. To put it
another way, the jury is ... the safety valve that must exist if this
society is to be able to accommodate itself to its own internal
stresses and strains.9'
The concept that the jury, as the conscience of the community,
has the final obligation to weigh the defendant's conduct in the light
of community mores and acquit if the moral worth of his act outweighs
the social utility of punishing his conduct as a transgression of law, is,
in a sense, merely one part of a much larger issue of criminal responsi-
bility.
Generally, in order to hold a man liable under the criminal law
for violation of its provisions, it is necessary that the prosecution dem-
onstrate that the defendant had the necessary criminal intent. Where
there is doubt on this question, the jury must determine the defendant's
criminal responsibility. The subject area of criminal responsibility is
neglect of our environmental resources. We need the full participation of each
individual. We can no longer afford to be a people who unthinkingly serve.
This brings us back to what happened in Washington. The procedures used
against demonstrators who tried to block traffic were flagrantly un-Constitutional.
There were arrests without cause-mass roundups, which often included any
young person, however innocent, who happened to be visible to the police. Pris-
oners were not subject to normal arrest procedure. Many were kept at detention
centers without being afforded the basic rights of arrested persons. All this, like
the murderous driving, was not the product of officers gone beserk but was part
of coldly rational plans sanctioned, and later praised, by high authorities. Indeed,
the same high authorities have recommended that similar tactics be used again.
Can the policemen and bus drivers in question say they are doing all they can to
respect the fundamental law of the land if they simply follow orders? Can the civil
servants who drove to work that morning, maybe sympathetic to the peace move-
ment but afraid of a demerit, call themselves law-abiding? I am suggesting that
following orders is no longer good enough for any of us-not if we want our
Constitution preserved. Each of us has a permanent and personal duty to the su-
preme law of the land. I do not mean the "law" that the Nixon Administration
speaks of-something that I would call "force," or "state power." I think the
Nixon Administration is deeply contemptuous of law. We cannot count on At-
torney General Mitchell to preserve the law, nor, I fear, can we count on the
courts. And, from a certain point of view, that is as it should be. It is our Consti-
tution, not theirs.
91. Kunstier, Jury Nullification in Conscience Cases, 10 VA. J. INT'L LAw 71, 83 (1969).
1972]
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almost wholly dominated by the problem of insanity. This dominance
of the insanity issue over the entire field of criminal responsibility has
been unfortunate because it has stunted the growth of other possible
criminal responsibility defenses. In so doing, the insanity issue has ob-
scured the full range of the role and function of the jury in a consti-
tutional democracy.
In the area of insanity, the jury is asked to make a complicated
decision "intertwining moral, legal, and medical judgments."0 2 Usu-
ally left to the jury is the question of whether in scientific fact, as dem-
onstrated by the expert evidence introduced into the case, the medical
or psychiatric condition which exculpates a defendant from liability
for the consequences of his act was present. Thus, the jury is asked to
act solely as a referee in a battle of experts despite the lack of expertise
on their, part to make a responsible and intelligent choice. Recently
however, two discussions of the role of the jury in criminal responsi-
bility cases have appeared in opinions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia which show an increasing recog-
nition of a broader role of the jury in criminal cases in general, as well
as criminal responsibility issues in particular.
In Everett v. United States,93 the defendant pleaded guilty to rob-
bery and assault with intent to commit robbery, but he sought, before
sentencing, to withdraw his guilty plea to one of the counts although
he expressed his guilt as to the charge. He claimed in mitigation that
he was forced to steal because he was poor and his pregnant wife was in
need of medical attention. The District Court judge exercised his dis-
cretion by refusing the withdrawal of the guilty plea and his decision
was upheld on appeal. In a dissenting opinion, Judge J. Skelly Wright
attempted to more carefully articulate the "community conscience"
role of the jury than had been expressed by the court before. He said:
Reflected in the jury's decision is a judgment of whether, under all
the circumstances of the event and in the light of all known about
the defendant, the prohibited act, if committed, deserves condemna-
tion by the law.0 4
The theory of moral condemnation as the basis of criminal law is
argued most cogently by Henry Hart in his classic article The Aims of
the Criminal Law.95 Hart concludes that "what distinguishes a criminal
92, K ng v. United States, 372 V.2d 383, 389 (1967).
93. 336 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
94. Id. at 985-86 (Wright, J., dissenting).
95. "23 LAW & CoN-rEM. PROB. 401 (1958).
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from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it... is the judgment of
community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposi-
tion."9 0 Under his analysis, "criminality is to be equated with anti-so-
cial conduct warranting the moral condemnation of society." If Hart
is right, and if the jury has the important function of determining
criminal liability, then the guilty verdict of the jury should mean that
the community which the jury represents considers this defendant's
conduct to be deserving of moral condemnation. Likewise, the jury
should never return a verdict of guilty unless this moral condemnation
judgment can be made. Thus, even if there appears to be a technical
violation of the literal law as it is given to the jury by the judge in his
instructions, the jury must not convict unless it can in full and clear
conscience say: "This act is morally condemned by the community."
In the words of Judge Wright:
The Colonial case wherein John Peter Zenger was prosecuted for
seditious libel stands as a landmark instance where the defendant
went to the jury on his admission of the facts charged and his claim,
nevertheless, of no culpability. By acquitting Zenger, the jury ful-
filled its role as protector against unjust laws or their unfair ap-
plication. In the century following the Zenger case, it was generally
recognized in American jurisprudence that the jury, agent of the
sovereign people, had a right to acquit those whom it felt it unjust
to call crimina.... Modem discussions in both criminal and civil
law have re-emphasized this "dispensing" function of the jury.9 7
A line of argument similar to that of Judge Wright appears in the
concurring opinion of Chief Judge Bazelon in United States v. Rich-
berg.98 The question was whether a jury verdict for conviction would
stand in the face of evidence of lack of criminal responsibility. The de-
fense contended that the government failed to prove criminal respon-
sibility beyond a reasonable doubt. The court affirmed the jury verdict,
noting that in the area of criminal responsibility the jury is given great
deference because of the complicated decision involved. Judge Bazelon,
concurring in the result, expressed some concern over the role of the
jury in this whole area. Since the full panel of the court is scheduled
to decide what will become a landmark-case, United States v. Brawner,99
Judge Bazelon took the opportunity to develop his thoughts at length
96. Id. at 404.
97. Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Wright, J., dissent-
ing).
98. 439 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
99. No. 22,744 (D.C. Cir.), re-argued en banc, April 12, 1971.
1972]
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on the role of the jury. He concluded that the jury has a special role in
deciding criminal responsibility issues. In the first place, they must as-
certain and decide the extent to which there was an impairment of the
defendant's "mental and emotional processes and behavior controls."
But in addition, the jury has a second and arguably more important
function to perform:
The second function is to evaluate that impairment in light of com-
munity standards of blameworthiness, to determine whether the
defendant's impairment makes it unjust to hold him responsible.
The jury's unique qualification for making that determination
justifies our unusual deference to the jury's resolution of the issue
of responsibility 0 0
Bazelon accepts the dual function of the jury but is troubled by
the fact that though they are instructed as to the first function, they are
not instructed as to the second. Reasoning from cases of negligence in-
volving the amorphous concepts of "duty" and "proximate cause,"
Bazelon points out that these terms are devoid of all meaning except
that given to them by the jury when they add their understanding of
prevailing community standards. Then, under those standards, they
must determine whether the law should hold the defendant liable for
the deleterious consequences of his conduct. Like "duty" and "proxi-
mate cause," the term "mental illness" is devoid of meaning without
a jury determinant of community blameworthiness. Bazelon's concern
about proper jury instructions reflects the grave concern about the
proper workings of the legal order which have consistently been a hall-
mark of his judicial opinions and legal philosophy:
It seems to me that we need to find some way to explain to the jury
this aspect of their task in resolving the question of responsibility.
The jury is presently told that an exculpatory mental illness is a
condition that impairs the defendant's mental or emotional pro-
cesses and behavior controls in a manner that can be characterized
as "substantial." I would add to that instruction the comment that
impairment is a question of degree, and that an impairment is
"substantial" for the purpose of the insanity defense if the jury
finds that the defendant's processes and controls were impaired to
such an extent that he cannot justly be held responsible for his act.
It seems to me, however, that if our whole approach to judicial
review of the jury's determination depends on the theory that the
100. United States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring).
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jurors are measuring mental disability in terms of community
concepts of blameworthiness then we have an obligation to tell
them that is what they are expected to do. °1
Judge Bazelon's articulation of the function of the jury in the area
of criminal responsibility is fully consistent with the role of the jury
in a constitutional democracy argued here as the underpinning for the
jury instruction on the nullification right. Since there is no dispute
that the jury has the power to nullify, the question is do they have the
right to do so?
It is perhaps too simplistic an answer to respond that the power of
the jury, unchecked and uncheckable, is tantamount to a right. Yet, to
some extent this response is not only true but also unanswerable.
The Supreme Court of Vermont in 1848 dealt with the nullifica-
tion issue and concluded that
when political power is conferred on a tribunal without re-
striction or control, it may be lawfully exerted; that the power of
a jury in criminal cases to determine the whole matter in issue
committed to their charge, is such a power, and may therefore be
lawfully and rightfully exercised; in short, that such a power is
equivalent to, or rather, is itself, a legal right. . . . The extent of
jurisdiction of a court or jury is measured by what they may or may
not decide with legal effect, and not by the correctness or error of
their decisions.102
The real inquiry is whether the defendant has the right to appeal
to the jury's ability to nullify by introducing evidence of moral justifi-
cation and by requesting and receiving a nullification instruction.
Under an expansion of Judge Bazelon's view, the defendant has
the right to an instruction on nullification and the jury has the right
to be told of its nullification power. In all cases where the jury acts as
representatives of the community and must apply a community judg-
ment, they have the right to be instructed of their function. Since nulli-
fication involves a refusal to allow the normal criminal sanction to
attach, on the basis of the conscience of the community, the issue for
jury decision must be whether by contemporary standards of moral
blameworthiness the defendant should be punished for his actions. If
in criminal responsibility cases the jury is to find culpability only when
it is just to do so, how can the nullification right be denied in cases
101. Id. at 625-26.
102. State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14, 47 (1848).
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where this very concept of justice is appealed to as a defense? Why
should a justice standard be articulated only for those who claim in-
sanity? The question of criminal responsibility in all cases is the same:
whether it is just to punish the defendant. The only difference between
various cases is the evidence introduced by the prosecutor and the de-
fense to make their respective points. The reductio ad absurdum of
having a different standard for insanity than for any other responsibil-
ity argument was perhaps demonstrated at the trial of the "Chicago
15" for burning draft files. The 15 attempted to plead "cultural insan-
ity." The basis of their argument was that their views were so different
from those of the ruling class that they had to be deemed mad by them.
The fortuitous remark of Vice-President Agnew that certain elements
of the society, which included the Chicago 15, were criminally insane,
led the defense to try to subpoena him as an expert. All attempts to in-
troduce foundation testimony of persons qualified to judge mental con-
ditions were refused by the court.10 3
The two main points of Judge Bazelon's analysis exactly coincide
with the argument for the right of jury nullification: the jury in cases
of criminal responsibility cannot hold this particular defendant crim-
inally liable for his conduct under the prevailing circumstances unless
it is just to do so under contemporary community standards, and the
jury, in order to function properly, must be instructed as to the role
it plays in the trial process. The stresses under which the jury operates
can be greatly relieved with jury instructions that are more responsive
to the role of a jury in a constitutional democracy and more consistent
with the ideals of the public adversary trial. In the words of Judge
Bazelon in a recent speech:
It's easy for the public to ignore an unjust law, if the law operates
behind dosed doors and out of sight. But when jurors have to use a
law to send a man to prison, they are forced to think long and hard
about the justice of the law. And when the public reads newspaper
accounts of criminal trials and convictions, they too may think
about whether the convictions are just. As a result, jurors and
spectators alike may bring to public debate more informed interest
in improving the criminal law. Any law which makes many people
uncomfortable is likely to attract the attention of the legislature.
The laws on narcotics and abortion come to mind-and there must
be others. The public adversary trial thus provides an important
mechanism for keeping the substantive criminal law in tune with
contemporary community values.104
103. See Moberg, The Chicago 15, LmmTioN (Autumn 1970).
104. D. Bazelon, supra note 61.
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The high-water mark of contemporary jury nullification may very
well be the trial of the "Oakland Seven." In any politically-charged
case where there is a jury acquittal, it is not always clear whether the
verdict was a product of the inability of the prosecutor to prove his
case beyond a reasonable doubt or rather was a demonstration that the
case was so well proven that the real motive for prosecution became all
too clear: stifling political dissent. Or the verdict could quite easily be
a combination of deficient proof and juror outrage over governmental
repression. Because of this ambiguity, and because questions of intent
are vague enough to give jurors room to nullify subconsciously by hon-
estly believing that criminal intent is not consistent with good faith
resistance to seemingly unjust laws or applications of law, any descrip-
tion of an acquittal as an instance of jury nullification may not be en-
tirely accurate. Revelations by jurors after the rendition of the verdict,
although somewhat self-serving at that time, furnish some help.
The trial of the Oakland Seven grew out of indictments brought
against leaders of Stop the Draft Week which occurred outside the
Oakland Armed Forces Induction Center in October, 1967. Demonstra-
tions designed to show opposition to the war and the draft were planned
and staged along with attempts to physically interfere with the normal
course of business of the Induction Center.
In January, seven persons were indicted for conspiracy (a felony)
to commit three misdemeanors: trespass, creating a public nuisance and
resisting arrest. Although hundreds of persons were involved, only these
seven were indicated on conspiracy charges. The District Attorney of
Alameda County, J. Frank Coaldey, told the Oakland Tribune:
Technically, a hundred or even a thousand of the demon-
strators could have been indicted for their action, but we simply
don't have enough courts so we have to take the most militant
leaders. 105
The acquittal verdict in the case might not be surprising consider-
ing the weakness in the case presented by the prosecutor and the very
liberal instructions given which allowed the jury to consider the de-
fendant's belief in the illegality of the war as an item to be weighed
in determining whether they had a criminal intent, and declared that
much of the evidence presented concerned conduct protected by the
first amendment. Nevertheless, post-trial interviews with the jurors
105. See Bardacke, The Oakland 7, THE RzALis 1,3 (Nov.-Dec. 1969).
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conducted by Elinor Langer'0 8 suggest that the underlying political
motivations behind the trial were fully recognized:
The Oakland Seven jury wanted to find the defendants innocent.
"I tried to examine the prosecution's argument," commented one
juror, the keeper of records in an industrial firm, "but I thought it
meant, in other words, that people should be puppets, go along. If
that were true, our democratic procedures wouldn't be worth much.
I'm not a puppet, I'm a free thinker. I wonder what the prosecution
would have made of the Boston Tea Party, a 'costly and disruptive
demonstration.' Our early leaders were all radicals, they had to be."
This juror, a man in his thirties, attended the post acquittal party.
The colonel: "I was very caught up in the details of the case, but
I also understood in a brief flash, if they could do that to these
boys they could do it to anyone; they can stop all dissent." A
woman, the bookkeeper, was stirred even beyond most of her fellow
jurors into the experience that leftists call "radicalization": "Now
I understand how dangerous being a fence-sitter can be. I was one
of those people, I'm not too proud of it, who sat on my can all the
time. People who do that are playing into the hands of the power
structure. I can see why young people hate us. But I can never be
neutral anymore." She is reading Eldridge Cleaver-"to see why the
defendants stood up for the Panthers"-and studying a book on the
Vietnam War. The black member of the jury, a Post Office em-
ployee, found himself more stirred than he expected by the wit-
nesses' stories of police brutality. The night of the acquittal, as he
was leaving the courthouse, he raised his arm to the defendants in
the black power salute: the first, it seemed, he had ever given in his
life.107
The success of the Oakland Seven in raising the political conscious-
ness of the jurors is a direct result of their conduct of their defense. As
one of the defendants explains: 0 8
We had a simple defense strategy. We attempted to focus at-
tention on the war in Vietnam, police brutality and the First
Amendment. We tried to force the jury to vote not on our guilt
or innocence, but rather for or against the war, for or against the
police, and for or against free speech.
Each witness tried to get across our three major political
points. The first question to every witness was, why did you attend
106. Langer, The Oakland 7, THE AmN ic 76, 82 (Oct. 1969).
107. Id. at 82.
108. Bardacke, supra note 105, at 7.
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the demonstration? This allowed the witness to give a short speech
against the war. In some cases the witnesses gave long speeches
against the war-[Judge] Phillips allowed that because the wit-
ness supposedly was only reporting what he earlier had said to a
defendant. Then the typical witness said that he was not under
orders from any of the defendants and that the demonstration was
organized just like any other demonstration. Finally the witness
reported incidents of police brutality.109
Critics may protest this use of the judicial forum for the advocacy
of political views and speak of the inadequacy of the courts to handle
political questions. But it must be remembered that for purposes of the
jury nullification argument, the jurors are as free to reject the defen-
dant's politics as they are to reject the defendant's version of the facts;
and though the court may not be the ideal place to resolve political
issues, the only issue for decision is not political in the criminal trial-
it is the legal issue of guilt or innocence. The jury is not asked to de-
cide which political side they are on, it is asked to decide the legal
status of an alleged violation of the criminal laws. If the jury is per-
suaded by the defendants' politics (and is this any different from being
persuaded by his oratorical ability, for example, or by his cool demea-
nor?) then perhaps the prosecutor ought to learn a valuable lesson about
the exercise of his discretion for the public good. Elinor Langer's con-
clusion about the trial of the Oakland Seven bears repeating:
Perhaps the main consequence of the Oakland Seven trial is that
twelve jurors were moved from apathy to affirmation. Presented
with honest evidence about the motives and intentions of the left,
they defied the repressive logic of their political authorities and
said, "You cannot do it. Americans are still free men." Twelve
jurors were, as the left says, "organized," and if that seems a small
number, a high price, and a slow pace, it still may be a portent of
more to come.11 0
V. CURRENT STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE OF
JURY NULLIFICATION
A. STATE LAW
In most states the jury nullification issue either never arises or has been
settled adversely since at least the middle 1800's.111 Two state constitu-
109. Id.
110. Langer, supra note 106, at 82.
ill. See Howe. supra note 34; Coe, The Province of Juries on Criminal Cases, 39
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tions, however, contain pro visions which give the jury the right to de-
cide both the law and the facts.
Article XV, section 5 of the Constitution of Maryland states that:
In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of
Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.
The following instruction is typically given pursuant to this section:
Members of the jury, this is a criminal case and under the Constitu-
tion and laws of the State of Maryland in a criminal case the jury
are the judges of the law as well as of the facts in the case. So that
whatever I tell you about the law while it is intended to be helpful
to you in reaching a just and proper verdict in the case, it is not
binding upon you as members of the jury and you may accept the
law as you apprehend it to be in the case.' 12
Juries in Maryland have had the right to decide questions of law
in criminal cases since at least the Constitution of 1851, which was the
first time this provision appeared in the law. Under Maryland law,
however, the jury does not decide questions of the sufficiency of the
evidence nor questions of the constitutionality of statutes. 113
Despite the longevity of this jury role, jurists in Maryland have
termed the practice "an anomolous situation" which is a "blight" on
the administration of justice in Maryland, 114 an "archaic, outmoded
and atrocious" practice,"5 a "unique and indefensible procedure,""16
CENT. L.J. 321 (1894); State v. Burpee, 65 Vt. 1, 25 A. 964 (1892); State v. Wright, 53 Me.
328 (1865); Commonwealth v. Porter, 10 Met. 263 (Mass. 1845); Commonwealth v. Anthcs,
5 Gray 185 (Mass. 1857); Pleasant v. State, 13 Ark. 360 (1853); State v. Gannon, 75 Conn.
206, 52 A. 727 (1902); State v. Jeandell, 5 Har. 475 (Del. 1848-1855); Grown v. State, 40
Ga. 689 (1870); People v. Bruner, 343 11. 146, 175 N.E. 400 (1931); Montee v. Common-
wealth, 3 J.J. Marsh 182 (Ky. 1830); Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173 (1874); Williams
v. State, 32 Miss. 389 (1856); Parrish v. State, 14 Neb. 60 (1883); Pierce v. State, 13 N.H.
536 (1843); Roese v. State, 62 N.J. Law 216, 41 A. 408 (1898); Duffy v. People, 26 N.Y.
588 (1863); Pennsylvania v. Bell, 1 Addison 156 (1793); State v. Drawdy, 14 Rich. 87 (S.C.
1866); State v. Syphrett, 27 S.C. 29 (1887); Harris v. State, 7 Lea 588 (Tenn. 1881); State
v. Dickey, 48 W. Va. 325, 37 S.E. 695 (1900).
112. Quoted from Wyley v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 372 F.2d 742, 743 n.2
(4th Cir. 1967).
113. Franklin v. State, 12 Md. 286 (1858).
114. Prescott, Juries as Judges of the Law: Should the Practice be Continued? 60
Mo. S.B.A. RPM. 246, 257 (1955).
115. Id.
116. Henderson, The Jury as Judges of Law and Fact in Maryland, 52 M. S.B.A.
RTr. 184, 199 (1947).
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a "Constitutional thorn" in the "flesh of Maryland's body of Criminal
Law," 117 and an "incongruous state."' 18 Yet, there is no showing in any
of these opinions that the jury role causes substantial harm or that the
practice violates constitutional due process standards. Indeed, one ju-
rist notes that since most cases are decided without juries, there is no
real disruption of the administration of justice at all.119
Despite this caustic criticism, Maryland courts have repeatedly up-
held the constitutional provision against challenges to its legal validity.
In Slansky v. State,120 the Court of Appeals exhaustively detailed the
history and purpose of section 5 and upheld it against a claim that it
violated due process of law under the federal constitution's fourteenth
amendment. In Giles v. State,'12 an argument claiming this jury right
violated the federal equal protection clause was rejected. Maryland
courts have read this section to permit the trial judge to determine ad-
missibility of evidence and the comptency of witnesses, 122 to overturn
a verdict of guilty if that verdict is against the law, and to grant a new
trial. 123 In addition, the judge may take the case from the jury and di-
rect a verdict of acquittal. 124 These rulings are not contrary to the spirit
of article XV, section 5 and they make the application of its terms
more conducive to justice.125
Article I, section 19 of the Indiana Constitution provides: "In all
criminal cases whatsoever, the jury shall have the right to determine the
law and the facts." Not unlike its Maryland counterpart, this provision
has been the subject of adverse commentary. 26 Nevertheless, the valid-
ity of this provision has been recently upheld.12 7 In addition, the Su-
preme Court of Indiana has seen fit to answer critics of this jury role
by stating that:
117. Dennis, Maryland's Antique Constitutional Thorn, 92 U. PA. L. REv. 34 (1943).
118. Markell, Trial by Jury-A Two-Horse Team Or One-Horse Teams?, 42 MN,
S.B.A. Rs rR. 72, 81 (1937).
119. Dennis, supra note 117, at 39.
120. 192 Md. 94, 63 A.2d 599 (1949).
121. 229 Md. 370, 183 A.2d 359, appeal dismissed for want of a federal question, 372
U.S. 967 (1963).
122. Rasin v. State, 153 Md. 431, 138 A. 338 (1927).
123. See Wyley v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 372 F.2d 742, 743 n.2 (4th Cir.
1967).
124. Chisley v. State, 202 Md. 82, 95 A.2d 577 (1953).
125. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Court noted these judicial limita-
tions as a reason for not questioning the constitutionality of article XV, section 5.
126. Note, 24 NomE DAME LAw. 365 (1949).
127. Holliday v. State, 257 N.E2d 579 (1970).
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It appears to this court that Art. I, §19 taken in conjunction
with the presumption of innocence is far from an outmoded,
archaic anachronism. Rather, despite its venerable age, it appears
to be in the vanguard of modem thinking with regard to the full
protection of the rights of the criminal defendant. 28
The court held that a mandatory instruction informing the jury that
if they found certain facts to be true they had to find the defendant
guilty constituted reversible error. It found this type of instruction a
more serious threat to the rights of a defendant than the possibility that
a jury will believe that it has the right under section 19 to find the de-
fendant guilty when he should be acquitted. According to the court,
if such a case occurs the trial judge has the inherent "power and duty"
to grant a motion for a new trial, and if the judge fails to so act the
duty falls on the appellate court.'2 9 This position, insofar as it recog-
nizes the lack of symmetry between acquittal and conviction, is con-
sistent with the nullification argument.
Several state constitutions, recognizing the genesis of the nullifica-
tion right, provide that juries determine both the law and the facts in
cases of criminal or seditious libel. 8 0
128. Pritchard v. State, 248 Ind. 566, 230 N.E.2d 416, 421 (1967).
129. Judge Arterburn's dissent on the grounds that the Court's ruling denies the
trial judge the right to issue a mandatory instruction of acquittal thus seems to be
dearly wrong.
130. Ever since the Zenger case in colonial New York, Americans have insisted
it is essential to freedom of speech that only a jury should be able to punish a
man for expressing questionable views. Even if the jury acquits in disregard of
the letter of the law, this is accepted as right, because a man ought not to suffer
for saying what a cross-section of the community believes the community has a
right to hear. And if the jury goes too far the other way and convicts the man
improperly, its action is subjected to substantial supervision by judges, up to the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Any proceeding was abhorrent to our ancestors which allowed active mem-
bers of the government in power to determine the wrongfulness of speech and
printing so as to impose various types of penalties. For this reason our ancestors
detested censorship by officials and taxes on knowledge imposed by legislatures.
Chafee, 35 Years With Freedom of Speech, 1 KANSAs L. Rnv. 1, 21 (1952). The states are:
Alabama (Art. I, sec. 12); California (Art. I, sec. 9); Colorado (Art. II, sec. 10); Connecticut
(Art. First, sec. 7); Delaware (Art. I, sec. 5); Georgia (Art. I, sec. II, para. 1) ("The power
of the judge to grant new trials, in cases of conviction, is preserved.'); Kentucky (Bill of
Rights, sec. 9); Louisiana (Art. XIV, sec. 9); Maine (Art. I, sec. 4); Mississippi (Art. 3, sec.
13); Missouri (Art. I, sec. 8); Montana (Art. III, sec. 10); New Jersey (Art. I, sec. 6); New
York (Art. I, sec. 8); North Dakota (Art. I, sec. 9); Orgeon (Art. 1, sec. 16); Pennsylvania
(Art. I, sec. 7); South Carolina (Art. II, sec. 21); South Dakota (Art. VI, sec. 5), Tennessee
(Art. I, sec. 19); Texas (Art. I, sec. 8); Utah (Art. I, sec. 15); Wisconsin (Art. I, sec. 3);
Wyoming (Art. I, sec. 20). Some of these provisions may be limited to mean simply the
right of the jury to return a general verdict but all are phrased in terms of the right of
the jury to decide questions of law and fact in libel cases.
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Kansas state jury instructions are presently being revised with the
following alternative formulations of the binding effect on the jury of
the judge's instructions on the law under consideration:
51.02 CONSIDERATION AND BINDING APPLICATION OF
INSTRUCTIONS
It is my duty to instruct you in the law that applies to this case
and it is your duty to follow all of the instructions. You must not
single out certain instructions and disregard others. You should
construe each instruction in the light of and in harmony with the
other instructions, and you should apply the instructions as a whole
to the evidence. You should decide the case by applying the law to
the facts as you find them. The order in which the instructions are
given is no indication of their relative importance.
Notes on Use
This instruction embodies the traditional concept that the jury
is required to abide by the instructions even though they might
believe the instructions are inappropriate considering the circum-
stances of the particular case.
For an alternative instruction, see 51.08, Consideration and
Guiding Application of Instructions.
51.03 CONSIDERATION AND GUIDING APPLICATION OF
INSTRUCTIONS
It is presumed that juries are the best judges of fact. Accord-
ingly, you are the sole judges of the true facts in this case.
I think it requires no explanation, however, that judges are
presumed to be the best judges of the law. Accordingly, you must
accept my instructions as being correct statements of the legal prin-
ciples that generally apply in a case of the type you have heard.
The order in which the instructions are given is no indication
of their relative importance. You should not single out certain in-
structions and disregard others but should construe each one in the
light of and in harmony with the others.
These principles are intended to help you in reaching a fair
result in this case. You should give them due respect. Moreover,
justice will ordinarily be done by applying them as a whole to the
facts which you find have been proven. You should do just that if,
by so doing, you can do justice in this case.
1972]
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Even so, it is difficult to draft legal statements that are so exact
that they are right for all conceivable circumstances. Accordingly,
you are entitled to act upon your conscientious feeling about what
is a fair result in this case.
Exercise your judgment without passion or prejudice, but
with honesty and understanding. Give respectful regard to my state-
ments of the law for what help they may be in arriving at a con-
scientious determination of justice in this case. That is your highest
duty as a public body and as officers of this court.
Notes on Use
Maryland recognizes that in criminal trials the jury is the
judge of both the facts and the law. In any state, the jury may
acquit in complete disregard of the instructions. The above instruc-
tion is thus perhaps a more honest statement as to the binding
effect of instructions than the conventional instruction, 51.02.
Arguably, the above instruction should bring into play the
underlying value of trial by jury: the application of community
conscience. If extenuating circumstances make an otherwise cul-
pable act excusable, a jury should feel empowered to so find. Com-
munity standards are more apt to be applied if the jurors are told
they are free to do what, overall, seems right to them.
It is recommended that this instruction not be given in a
criminal case if it is objected to by the defendant. For extended
argument in favor of this type of instruction see Van Dyke, The
Jury As A Political Institution, Center Magazine (Center For The
Study of Democratic Institutions), Vol. 3, No. 2, (March 1970).131
Instruction 51.03 represents a recognition of the right of the jury
to consider their conscience as a basis for acquittal. As the Note points
out, this instruction is more honest than the more typical instruction
as represented by 51.02. Endorsement of the spirit of 51.03 by advo-
cates of the nullification role of the jury should be forthcoming, but
such endorsement should not conceal that this instruction, as drafted,
does not properly differentiate between acquittal and conviction. Nor
does the Note help by saying that "community standards are more apt
to be applied if the jurors are told they are free to do what, overall,
seems right to them." The proponents of nullification do not argue
that the jury should base its decision on what is popular in the com-
munity, thus failing to give proper weight to procedural protections
131. P.I.K. Criminal §§ 51.02 and 51.03 (Draft, 1971).
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embodied in the Bill of Rights and the history of the right to jury trial
itself. Rather, the nullification argument allows the "suspension" of
the guilty verdict where that verdict would compromise the juror's
conscience. Section 51.03 appears to agree in purpose with this position
and the addition of explanatory language in the body of the instruc-
tion to clarify this point will make 51.03 an ideal guide for jury de-
liberations.
B. FEDnE.AL LAw
Several federal courts have recently rejected the jury nullification argu-
ment as presented directly by a request for a ruling that the jury may
acquit on the basis of conscience.
In United States v. Moylan, 32 the Fourth Circuit faced the jury
nullification issue in the context of a protest directed at the Selective
Service System. Nine members of the Catholic clergy entered a Local
Board of the Selective Service System in Catonsville, Maryland and
removed draft files to a parking lot next door. The files were then de-
stroyed with homemade napalm. The defendants did not deny that
they did the acts ascribed to them but claimed moral justification for
their conduct. They sought a jury nullification instruction. The trial
judge denied their motion and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, in affirming, examined the nullification argument.
According to that court, juries in criminal cases retained the right
to decide questions of law and fact for approximately 50 years after the
American Revolution.133 It was at that point that judges gradually as-
serted themselves increasingly through their instructions on the law.13 4
132. 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969).
133. See references at notes 24, 33, 34 and 35 supra.
134. See Farley, Instructions to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE
L.J. 194 (1932); See Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74
Ymm LJ. 170 (1964). In reality, the settled right-of the jury to nullify the instruction of
the judge and acquit for reasons of conscience was lost, or at least diminished, by a power
struggle in which professional judges sought tighter controls over the legal apparatus of
the trial. Aside from the defendant, the jury represents the last remnant of lay par-
ticipation in the processes of law. Yet their role was weakened by judges desirous of
bringing jury verdicts more closely in line with judicial verdicts. Through manipulation
of the rules of evidence, judges were able to gain more control over juries, which they
regarded as an element of irrationality and instability in a legal system committed to
the values of order and predictability. But, though the rules of evidence developed as a
mode of jury control, nevertheless substantive rights turned upon the efficacy of those
rules. Thus, judges were able to change the law by their control over the questions of
the admissibility and relevance of information to be presented at trial, and the decision
1972]
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Despite the increasingly undermined rights of the jury, however, its
power to acquit has remained. The court declared so by stating:
We recognize ... the undisputed power of the jury to acquit,
even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge and
contrary to the evidence .... If the jury feels that the law under
which the defendant is accused is unjust, or that exigent circum-
stances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which
appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit,
and the courts must abide by that decision. 35
The jury therefore retains the "sovereign power to acquit"180 and the
judge may not tamper with their verdict. If the jury finds the defendant
to be innocent, he goes free even if their verdict is contrary to both
law and fact. There is no appeal to a higher court from a verdict of not
guilty.
But is it a good thing that the jury has the power to nullify and
acquit in contradiction of the judges' instructions on the law? The
court of appeals begrudgingly says yes, at least in some cases: "Conced-
edly, this power of the jury is not always contrary to the interest of
justice."' 37 The example cited to demonstrate a jury verdict against the
law as being necessary for justice is the Zenger case. The implication
being, of course, that if the jury had performed the way the court says
it should perform, the judicial system would have been unable to dis-
pense justice in that case; Zenger would have rotted in a New York jail
and freedom of the press would have been an idle dream.
But if jury nullification can be beneficial to the administration of
justice, why did the court refuse the defendant's request to instruct the
jury of its power? Because it believed that the jurors should not be
"encouraged in their 'lawlessness,' "13 and by instructing them that
of whether certain questions were to be decided by the judge or by the jury. Consider
the perceptive comments of a juror in a criminal case:
A jury should be considered a legislative body for the specific case. Statute
laws are necessarily generalities enacted by legislatures to control the usual re-
sults of a set of circumstances. But when a particular case becomes so involved
as to require court settlement, then the law needs to be adjusted to fit the specific
case. A jury of the litigant's peers might be best able to consider all circumstances
and to adjust the law to fit the case at hand. Without this function there is no
justification for a jury of peers at all. The trained lawyers and judges can know
the letter of the law and the history of precedents and can determine facts from
evidence better than a jury. They determine the facts anyway, by deciding what
evidence to present to the jury.
Letter from Richard P. Neville to CENTER MAGAZINE, reprinted at 79-80 (July 1970).
135. 417 F.2d at 1006.
136. Dami, supra note 60, at 89-91.
137. 417 F.2d at 1006.
138. Id.
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they have the power to disobey the court's description of the law "we
would indeed be negating the rule of law in favor of the rule of law-
lessness. This should not be allowed."' 39
Is jury nullification violative of the rule of law? Many people have
suggested that it is. Their arguments include the assertion that unless
the jury deliberations are governed by law and rules, we will have a
government of men and not of law;140 that if the jury is free to disregard
the judges' instructions then each man is free to pick and choose which
laws he will obey and which he will not be bound by;141 that if the jury
can disregard the judge we will be left with a law-less society; 142 and
that if the jury can acquit by ignoring the law why can it not also con-
vict in defiance of the law, or why can not the judge himself ignore
the law? 43
All of the above arguments are defective in that they circumvent
the basic function of the jury in the judicial process. The concept of
jury nullification derives its authenticity from a functional and histor-
ical analysis of the role of the jury in a democratic society, and, when
analyzed in those terms, is sufficient to meet the challenges just raised.
To say that our Republic is a government of laws and not of men
is to utter a descriptive statement about the law-dispensing procedures
of our governmental institutions. Certainly men make laws; the laws
do not appear in an eternal and immutable state. But to say that we
189. Id.
140. Brown, Commentary, 10 VA. J. INT'L LAW 108, 111 (1969):
.... Once we abandon a system of laws whose rules and principles govern the
deliberations of the jury, we revert to a government of men, not of law. If the
jury is not "under the law," and the accused's guilt or innocence is determined
not by principle but by a chance group of twelve individuals. How does this
method differ from the revolutionary tribunals of the French Revolution or from
Castro's Courts in Cuba? .... Of course juries have been known to acquit de-
fendants whose guilt was dearly established by legal and competent evidence be-
yond a reasonable doubt, but this is a far cry from the suggestion that juries
be empowered to reevaluate the law of the case according to their own transient
feeling of the legality or morality of the applicable law. I have confidence in the
good common sense of juries, but I cannot endorse a system that decides cases
on the random value judgments of juries rather than on a jury's judgment made
in accordance with the principles of law.
141. A. Fortas suggested in CENTER MAAZMNE 60 (July 1970) that:
W... hat is being proposed is not merely that jurors should be given the power
to determine what is the law, but that they should be instructed that they may
acquit a defendant even though they believe that he did something the law for-
bids. This goes to the heart of our society in which there are general rules of
lav and conduct which apply to everybody and to which everybody is held ac-
countable.
142. S. Rifkind, id. at 66:
... [The] proposal would create law-less society, not a lawless society, but a law-
less society, a society without law, without regulations. That is a monstrosity. No
such society has ever existed or will exist.
143. A. Fortas, id. at 61.
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are a government of laws and not of men means that the law is made
through recognized procedures which fulfill the democratic mandates
articulated in the Constitution and that, unlike Hobbes' sovereign,
these laws are binding upon all men so that no man is above the law.
Thus, one usually encounters the argument of a government of laws
and not of men when the legitimacy and legality of civil disobedience
is under discussion. The argument suggests that no one man, or group
of men, can take the law into his own hands or can stand above the
law that commands the rest of us. In the context of jury nullification,
the argument is posited that its existence contradicts the already estab-
lished procedures and allows a jury to be the ultimate legal authority
despite the existence of codified laws which are binding on all of us.
In short, it allows the jury to take the law into its own hands.144
The dangers of giving the jury the right to make new law are
quite real. In Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions,14 the House of
Lords gave the jury broad discretion to determine whether the defen-
dant was guilty of conspiring to corrupt public morals. The court let
the jury decide whether the defendant's acts were "corruptive" and how
"public morals" should be defined. The argument that such power
should not be given to the jury seems sound, especially in a legal sys-
tem which abhors ex post facto laws. But clearly there is a difference
between giving the jury the right to determine the substantive nature
of the offense as in Shaw, and giving them the right to refuse to apply
the law to the defendant. There is no law other than the jury's retro-
active determination and application in the first instance, and there-
fore there is no guide from which the accused may have patterned his
behavior. However, in the nullification situation the law pre-exists but
it remains subject to the juror's decision to pardon the accused's viola-
tions if good conscience so demands. Viewed from the perspective of
144. It is true that to some extent the jury system supplies this "give," or flexi-
bility. Jurors are not computers; sometimes they do come in with a verdict of
innocent when a computer would say that the facts add up to guilt and that the
defendant should be punished. We recognize and tolerate this as a worthwhile
anomaly in the rule of law. But if this occasional departure from the general
application of the law were to be institutionalized-if it were to become the rule
rather than the tolerated departure from the rule, we would have a kind of
anarchy; that is, a system in which the ultimate test of socially permissible con-
duct is, to a significant degree, the random reaction of a group of twelve people
selected at random. Acceptance of this as the principle governing individual con-
duct which collides with the rules adopted by governmental processes would, of
course, amount to rejection of law as the controlling principle of society.
Id.
145. [1961] 2 W.L-. 897, [1961], 2 All E.R. 446 (H.L.). See the discussion of this case
in DEvrN, supra note 60, at 86-101.
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protection of the individual, the jury power in Shaw abrogates the de-
fendant's procedural rights, jury nullification augments them.
We may very easily dispose of the argument that jury nullification
allows a man to pick and choose freely what laws he is willing to accept
and abide by, and what laws he dislikes and refuses to have binding on
him. That man must face a jury of his peers. As in any criminal trial,
the jury decides his fate. The final choice of obedience to law may rest
in the conscience of the individual but the decision as to whether his
choice transgresses permissible socio-legal boundaries is left to his fel-
lows. Thus, no man may judge the legal effect of his own moral stance.
Professor Paul Freund illustrates:
Even if juries were specifically allowed-or even encouraged-
to acquit conscientious dissenters, . . . there was no guarantee that
many would do so. This would leave the objector with an alterna-
tive.
He simply chooses martyrdom... hoping that his action
would sear the conscience of the community so that they'll change
the law. If such people set out to be martyrs, however, it doesn't
follow that the law must make martyrs, of them.146
Another criticism of jury nullification deals with the threat of a
"law-less" society. In imagery of anarchy and revolution, the argument
prophesizes the breakdown of all law, order and morality and a return
to a pre-contractual state of nature. But the argument states too much.
The historical fact of jury nullification in cases of seditious libel in
England and the United States fails to demonstrate a rending of the
seams of the legal garment led by jury revolt. Similarly, current ex-
amples of juries refusing to convict where sumptuary laws are involved
has not given rise to a breakdown of law and order. 47 In fact, there are
several obvious reasons why this is not likely to occur. All persons ac-
quitted by the jury would return to the community in which those
jurors live. It is unlikely that the jury would let any manner of crim-
inal run loose just for the thrill of defying the judge. People are more
cautious and concerned than that. Also, the empirical studies that have
146. Shenker, Leeway for Juries is Urged in Conscience Cases, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19,
1968, § 1, at 4, col. 4.
147. KAsvFN & ZEm-SL, supra note 44, at 286-97. Examples of jury refusal to convict
because of unpopular laws include violations of the gaming laws, gambling laws, liquor
law violations and drunk driving laws. Kalven and Zeisel note that in these cases "there
is the recurring theme that the prosecution of the particular defendant seems to be
selective and to violate the ideal of evenhanded administration of justice." Id. at 296-97.
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been done show that the jurors are too restrained by the gravity of
their role to unthinkingly release persons from criminal liability.148
Jury nullification occurs in very rare circumstances and results in the
acquittal of persons who the jury feels are victimized by the laws and
not victimizers of the society.
The specter of a "law-less" society is also absurd because juries now
possess power to nullify (and thus bring about this alleged evil) making
the real issue whether the judge should instruct them that they have
the right to do so. The numerous occasions in the South in which
white juries acquit white defendants of crimes against Blacks attest to
this power in a very dramatic way. While this aspect of jury power may
seem deplorable because crimes of personal violence go unpunished,
there has been no further movement towards anarchy and the law-less
society. Thus, even the drastic cases showing jury nullification in its
worst light do not lead to the conclusion that the administration of
justice will be generally subverted by revolutionary jury conduct. The
solution to the white southern jury problem is not removal of nullifi-
cation but rather education of the community and greater participa-
tion in the administration of justice by disenfranchised groups. The
need for nullification decreases to the extent that the community par-
ticipates in the processes of law and its enforcement. The white-man's
court convicts Blacks and acquits whites because the legal apparatus
is not responsive nor accountable to black persons in the community.
If Blacks had a role in the court structure and law enforcement agen-
cies, the specter of racism inherent in these acts of jury nullification
would disappear. 14 9
148. People have said, long before Lonnie McLucas was brought to trial, that thejury system in the United States is no longer a valid way of trying a case. My
approach to that was that if I were on trial, who would I want to determine my
fate? Anyone selected for a jury who doesn't feel a sense of responsibility or who
goes into it with a completely nonchalant attitude about it-I think he is a fool
for one thing, and a detriment to the judicial system. If you don't assume a
sense of responsibility in these matters, then you shouldn't be sitting on a jury.
In this case, we were determining the fate of another human being. It is a re-
sponsibility, no doubt about it.
These comments were made by a juror in the recent Lonnie McLucas case; see I YALE
REv. op LAw & Soc. AcroN 43 (1971).
149. See Burns, Can A Black Man Get a Fair Trial in This Country? N.Y. Times
Mag., July 12, 1970.
Not only is the white civil offender unrestrained by the legal system: the law is
his ally-an affirmative weapon. It is not surprising that neither the jury nor the
law has "legitimacy" for black litigants or the black community, when they so
obviously do not work for black people.
Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YArtE L.J. 531, 534-35 (1970). "It's a miracle they
don't burn down the courthouse. All they see is white people enforcing white laws de-
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Justice Abe Fortas has stated that nullification is "an attack on
law itself." For if a jury can "disregard a law, why shouldn't a judge
also be able to disregard it?" And if the jury can really nullify, why
can't they increase the punishment for a defendant or find him guilty
outside of the protection of the judge's rulings?160
In the case of the judge, the fallacy in the Fortas position is clear.
The conduct of the judge cannot be justified by recourse to the norma-
tive values which give the judiciary legitimacy. These values, articu-
lated in terms of neutrality and impartiality of the forum, are violated
by the judge who becomes partisan in the case. No such difficulty in-
heres in the jury nullification concept. The role of the jury, acting as
conscience of the community, acquitting for moral reasons, is support-
able under the democratic principles to which our country subscribes.
Popular control over governmental decision-making justifies the action
of the jury only and not the action of the judge. In fact, jury nullifica-
tion becomes all the more necessary by the existence of the kind of
judges described by Justice Fortas himself:
I think the major reason we cling to the jury system is becausejudges do become case-hardened. Judges do sometimes tend, after
many years, to take a somewhat jaundiced view of defendants.
Many trial judges tend to become a bit prosecution-minded. That's
the basic justification for a jury.15 1
The reason why the above rationale is the basic justification for the
signed to do them in." Murphy, D.C. Small Claims Court-The Forgotten Court, 34
D.C.BJ. 14, 15 (Feb. 1967).
to the poor man, "legal" has become a synonym for technicalities and ob-
struction, not for that which is to be respected. The poor man looks upon thelaw as an enemy, not as a friend. For him the law is always taking something
away.
Senator Robert F. Kennedy, quoted in REPORT or Tnz TAsK FORCE ON Li-w AND LAW EN-
FORCEMENT TO TE NATIONAL COMBISsION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE
(1969).
... The realities of our society emphasize the importance of jury panels drawnfrom a representative cross-section of the community. We have significant culturaldifferences almost unknown in our country thirty years ago. Litigants and wit-
nesses come into court from all walks of life in a highly varied community. Un-less jury panels represent the same walks of life and the same pattern of culturaldifferences, they will be less likely to understand fully the implications of thetestimony they hear and the situations they must evaluate, and less likely to bring
into their deliberations the background of experience and wisdom required fora just result. Similarly, the narrower the cultural spectrum of our jury panels,the less confidence te under-represented groups will have in the courts as Tem-
pies of Justice.
Mem. Dec. on Challenge to Jury Panel, People v. Mark Twain Craig, No. 41750 (Alameda,
Cal. Super. Ct. 1968).
150. See notes 141, 143-44 supra.
151. See text accompanying notes 176-77.
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jury is because the jury, through nullification, can ameliorate or correct
the injustices caused by the non-neutral judge. Surely if Fortas is right
about the reason for juries, and he is, we cannot expect those judges
to be perfectly fair in their instructions to the jury. The only way for
the jury to neutralize judicial partisanship is for it to disobey, for if it
obeyed, there would be virtually no correction and hence less justifica-
tion for its existence. 152 It is in just such cases that jury nullification
becomes vital to the maintenance of a democratic government with a
system of checks and balances. Thus, from the premises supporting the
existence of juries, as articulated by Justice Fortas, jury nullification
may be derived.
But what about jury conviction? If the jury has the power to nul-
lify by acquitting, surely they have the power to nullify by convicting.
It cannot be denied that the jury has this power. But it is not an ab-
solute and unchecked power. The defendant has a right of appeal and
thus higher authority will ultimately decide his fate. This fact alone
should show the asymmetry between acquittal and conviction, and
thus expose the inherent fallacy of the argument.153
Another reason exists which shows that "nullification" by convic-
tion is inconsistent with the jury nullification principle advocated here
in terms of the jury's right to be instructed that they may acquit on the
basis of conscience. In convicting dehors the judge's instructions, the
jury violates the basic tenet which justified its power of acquittal.
No popular curb on prosecutorial discretion exists in the case of jury
conviction. The jury underscores the indiscretion rather than under-
cutting it. In addition, the jury ceases to act as the conscience of the
community because it violates commitments to legal procedures and
protections upheld as normative values by that community.
The legitimacy of the court system depends upon its neutrality in
adhering to laws which protect the rights of people. The jury that con-
victs does not weigh these protections into its decision and thus acts
against the very interests it represents. For there is a strong community
value and commitment to the principle that no man may be convicted
without a jury of his peers and without due process of law. Conviction
152. Of course the defendant can always appeal and hope for a reversal, but the
transcript may not be able to convey the full range of the judge's influence on the jury
and there is no reason why trial court prejudices can only be corrected by a higher court
and not at the time they occur.
153. For support of this argument see L. ORFiELD, CaIMNAL PROCEDURE UNDER TE
FEDERAL RULES § 30:9 (1967).
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against the judge's instructions violates that community commitment
and weakens the rights of all its members. Acquittal of the defendant
does not abrogate Bill of Rights protections but rather it enhances
them. The point has been effectively made by Justice Harlan in his
concurring opinion in In re Winship'5 which held that the due pro-
cess clause constitutionally mandates that no conviction be upheld ex-
cept upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged. According
to Justice Harlan:
In a criminal case, on the other hand, we do not view the social
disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the dis-
utility of acquitting someone who is guilty.
In this context, I view the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental
value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.155
An additional factor necessary to consider when evaluating soci-
ety's commitment to the orderly process of law is the constitutional
proscription against ex post facto legislation.156 For the jury to convict
against the law as it has been announced to them is tantamount to find-
ing the defendant guilty of a crime when in fact his act may not have
been criminal but for the retroactive application of a new principle.
To allow juries to so function is to effectively end the rule of law.157
In this regard, jury conviction against the law is in fact a violation of
law whereas jury acquittal is the refusal to apply a law and therefore
is not a violation, but rather a suspension, of it. In a representative
democracy committed to the principle of legality, jury acquittal
through nullification provides a further exercise of discretion for the
protection of an accused in a criminal case, jury conviction against the
judge's instructions on the law makes a mockery of the social commit-
ment to a government of laws and not men.
Despite the strong arguments in favor of jury nullification and the
unpersuasive arguments urged against it, courts still refuse, for a vari-
ety of reasons, to recognize the right either of the defendant or the
jurors to an instruction as to this important function.
154. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
155. Id. at 372.
156. U.S. CoNSr. artide I, § 9(3).
157. L. FuiLER, Tim MoR Arny oF LAw 51-62 (rev, ed. 1969).
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In United States v. Sisson,'158 the court pointed out that in cases
where political issues run high, juries can vote their political convic-
tions and thereby disregard the judge's instructions. The justification
for this conduct is explained by Judge Learned Hand in United States
ex rel. McCann v. Adams;15 9
The institution of trial by jury-especially in criminal cases-has
its hold upon public favor chiefly for two reasons. The individual
can forfeit his liberty-to say nothing of his life-only at the hands
of those who, unlike any official, are in no ways accountable,
directly or indirectly, for what they do, and who at once separate
and melt anonymously in the community from which they came.
Moreover, since if they acquit their verdict is final, no one is likely
to suffer of whose conduct they do not morally disapprove; and this
introduces a slack into the enforcement of law, tempering its rigor
by the mollifying influence of current ethical conventions. A trial
by any jury, however small, preserves both these fundamental ele-
ments and a trial by a judge preserves neither, at least to anything
like the same degree.160
However, in Sisson the judge felt that any movement towards the broad
nullification powers exercised by juries in the seditious libel cases in
the 18th century should first be sanctioned by the United States Su-
preme Court and not introduced by a solitary district judge. This view,
however, ignores the fact that nullification is not a new doctrine but
rather is part of the current existing law. Though the right has been
dormant, the power has been frequently exercised.
Some promise for the resurrection of jury nullification was ex-
tended in United States v. Spock.161 Reasoning that the jury, as the con-
science of the community, "must be permitted to look at more than
logic" the court reversed a criminal conviction where the trial judge
had submitted to the jury a series of questions, labelled "special find-
ings," which they were to return in lieu of a general verdict. The First
Circuit found this to be an attempt to coerce a jury verdict of guilty
by improperly interfering with the jury's right to rely upon more than
logic in reaching its conclusion-an attempt, in other words, to force
the jury rationally to explain or justify its decision. The broad lan-
guage used in Spock, coupled with its citation of leading cases and ar-
ticles discussing nullification, suggested that the court, when faced
158. 294 F. Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968).
159. 126 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1942).
160. Id. at 775-76.
161. 416 F.2d 165 (Ist Cir. 1969).
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directly with the issue, might recognize the nullification right. These
expectations, however, were defeated in United States v. Boardman,162
where the court explained that Spock "was meant to preserve the ex-
isting balance between judge and jury, not to break new ground." This
existing balance is described as the power of the jury to ignore the law
although their duty is to apply it as interpreted by the court. Accord-
ing to the court, the instruction given by the judge should inform the
jury of their duty to adhere to the judge's rulings.
Boardman suffers from the same defect of reasoniig as Sisson: the
perception of the jury nullification right as something new. This error
can in part be traced to a comment made by Professor Freund of the
Harvard Law School which was reported in the New York Times, Sept.
19, 1968: "There ought to be some new doctrine which would permit
a judge to tell a jury that they were to decide in the light of all the
'circumstances' in cases involving 'people who act in a measured way
for reasons of conscience.' ":1 Rather than call for a new doctrine, the
call should be for the established one of jury nullification. Consider
the government's characterization of the nullification right in its Brief
before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
United States v. Dougherty:164
We view this contention, based as it is largely on English decisions,
mainly in seditious libel cases, rendered before 1800 and stretching
back into the early days of the common law, as an attempt to revive
a theory which was introduced into the law to curb the excesses of
a monarchy but which has no purpose under the present status of
the law and of democratic institutions in this country. Though the
power of juries to render verdicts as the conscience of the com-
munity has been recognized throughout our legal history, we know
of no case in the modern era holding that the jury can, let alone
must, be instructed that they can disregard the law as it is given to
them.
The government's argument is significant in two respects. It acknowl-
edges the fact that the current argument for jury nullification is not a
new argument but rather is an attempt to "revive" an important jury
function that has fallen into desuetude. Although the government nat-
urally underplays the strength of the doctrine, it does admit its prior
existence.
162. 419 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1970).
163. See note 146 supra.
164. Cr. No. 872-69 (filed Mar. 8, 1971). This is the case of the "D.C.-9."
19721
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Secondly, the government's argument attempts to justify the rejec-
tion of the use of the doctrine on grounds that the reason for its exis-
tence is no longer present.265 Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex. If,
therefore, it could be demonstrated that essentially the same conditions
are present today, the government's argument will fail. Or, if it can be
demonstrated that jury nullification is derived from democratic theory,
the government's argument will again fail. Since the government rec-
ognizes the power of the jury to acquit, the issue is whether the jury
should be told that they have the right to do so.
In the United States v. Fielding,'66 the court notes that:
An inherent feature of the common law trial by jury accorded
by the Constitution of the United States to all defendants in crim-
inal cases in Federal courts comprises the power of the jury to find
the defendant not guilty, even if the evidence of guilt is overwhelm-
ing or conclusive. A defendant may not be deprived of this right.
Even if there are not issues of fact left to be resolved, the defendant
cannot be deprived of his right to the possibility that a jury might
acquit him.
In United States v. Davis,167 defendant refused induction and was
convicted without a jury trial. On appeal, the case was reversed on
several grounds, one of them being the improper denial of the request
for a jury. The Government contended that since the defendant ad-
mitted he refused induction and since the jury cannot consider ques-
tions of the Selective Service classification of defendant, there were no
issues of fact for the jury to consider. The Fourth Circuit rejected this
argument:
... Davis and others like him are entitled to hear, if they wish, the
165. "Political prosecutions are the only ones in which a judge may be thought
likely to have a bias, and these are almost unknown among us." Coe, supra note I1l, at
325. Even if this observation, and that of the government in its Brief, were factually
accurate, both ignore the important fact that the structure of our government was de-
signed to protect against the possibility of such abuse of power. The central concepts of
democracy-self-rule and accountability of governmental decisions-necessitate jury nulli-
fication in order to protect the right of the people to govern themselves and thereby to
serve as a check on governmental despotism. For a very cogent argument on the mean-
ing of self-government under the Constitution, see Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is
An Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 245; A. MEIXIJOHN, POLITIMCAL FREEDOM (1948).
166. 148 F. Supp. 46, rev'd on other grounds, 102 U.S. App. D.C. 167, 251 F.2d 878
(D.C. Cir. 1957).
167. 413 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1969).
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verdict from a jury of their peers rather than from the court and
to hope, however irrationally, for acquittal. 168
At least this much is clear: The jury has the power to acquit against
the evidence and against the judge's instructions on the law, and the
defendant cannot be deprived of his right to an opportunity for the
jury to exercise this power. But how far does the defendant's right to
have the jury acquit extend?
From Davis we may conclude that the sixth amendment guarantee
of right to trial by jury is so important, so paramount, that it extends
to a right of the defendant to be given the chance to be acquitted, even
though such acquittal conflicts with both the facts and the judge's in-
structions on the law. Thus, if the argument that the jury has no right
to nullify, even though they clearly have the power to do so, is found
to be correct, as several courts have recently asserted, then the problem
can be approached in another way and one can derive from the sixth
amendment the defendant's right to the chance for jury acquittal. The
latter should include the right to a jury instruction explaining the de-
fendant's right. In other words, if defendant has a constitutional right
to a chance of jury acquittal, the jury should be told about it. Such an
instruction does not urge the jury to disregard the judge's instructions,
yet it does tell the jury that the defendant has a chance of acquittal
contrary to law and fact and that this result is permissible within the
legal system.
In United States v. Sawyers, 69 the question of the validity of the
Allen' " charge arose. In justifying its decision to uphold the charge,
the court said:
... The right to a hung jury, we think, is embraced within the
larger right to a verdict of acquittal when the jury is simply unable
to ascertain the facts upon which guilt must depend. This "second
chance of acquittal," as distinguished from a determination of
innocence, is bound up in our burden of proof and is similar to
the Scotch verdict "not proven." It is true, of course, that hung
juries have sometimes shored up liberty and it will doubtless occur
168. Id. at 153. See also United States v. Garaway, 425 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1970) (di-
rected verdict of guilty improper even where no issues of fact are in dispute).
169. 423 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1970).
170. The Allen charge allows the judge to instruct a deadlocked jury to try to reach
a verdict by asking that the jurors in the minority re-assess their position, though not to
give up conscientiously-held views. This instruction, often called the "dynamite" charge,
was approved in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
1972]
HeinOnline  -- 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 219 1972
220 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:168
again, but to assert that anyone has the right to hang a jury rather
than the right to a true verdict is erroneous.
The so-called "right" to a hung jury is at most no greater than
the right to an irrational verdict. See United States v. Moylan, 417
F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969); compare United States v. Davis, 413 F.2d
148 (4th Cir. 1969). With respect to either "right," it is clear that a
defendant may not insist upon a jury instruction advising jurors
they may deliberately hang the jury. Yet the power of jurors to do
both is beyond question.
A defendant has no "right" to either an irrational verdict or
a hung jury. He has only the right to have the jury speak without
being coerced. The very premise of our system is that juries are em-
paneled to ascertain the truth, which is the meaning of "verdict."
When a defendant occasionally benefits, if he does, from a
hung jury, he is getting not what he is entitled to have but some-
thing less.171
Clearly, there is no right to a hung jury just as there is no right
to an acquittal, But the Fourth Circuit's discussion is misleading be-
yond its assertion of the wrong issue. If the jury is instructed that the
defendant can only be found guilty by the unanimous consent of all
the jurors, does this instruction violate the courts' ruling that the jury
cannot be instructed that "any one of them may deliberately hang the
jury?" The answer must be no. Certainly the jury must be told that
any one vote contrary to the other eleven will hang the jury. How else
could the jurors understand their jobs? Perhaps the fundamental error
of the court's reasoning is its premise that a hung jury is an unaccept-
able solution. If, however, we take an opposite view, then the defen-
dant must have the right to a jury instruction as to their power to hang
the jury.
The concurring and dissenting opinion of Judge Brown in Huff-
man v. United States,172 is particularly relevant:
A consideration of this charge demonstrates that the Judge
was laboring under a basic misapprehension: that a criminal trial
must end with (1) a verdict of guilty or (2) a verdict of not guilty.
What he overlooked was that failure to agree at this trial is, at least
momentarily, a victory for the defense and a legitimate end of the
trial.
171. 423 F.2d at 1340-41.
172. 297 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1962).
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... It is simply not legally correct that some jury must sometime
decide that the defendant is "guilty" or "not guilty." The fact is,
as history reminds us, a succession of juries may legitimately fail
to agree until, at long last, the prosecution gives up. But such juries,
perhaps more courageous than any other, have performed their use-
ful, vital function in our system. This is the kind of independence
which should be encouraged. It is in this independence that liberty
is secured.
I think a mistrial from a hung jury is a safeguard to liberty.
In many areas it is the sole means by which one or a few may stand
out against an overwhelming contemporary public sentiment. Noth-
ing should interfere with its exercise. In the final analysis the Allen
charge itself does not make sense. All it may rightfully say is that
there is a duty to consider the views of others but that a conscien-
tious person has finally the right and duty to stand by conscience.
If it says that and nothing more it is a superfluous lecture in
citizenship. If it says more to declare that there is a duty to decide,
it is legally incorrect as an interference with that rightful indepen-
dence.173
If we accept Judge Brown's argument, the jury has the right to be
instructed as to the full extent of its powers. This would include an
instruction that one juror may hang the jury on the basis of conscience
or that the jury may acquit on the basis of conscience. The Fourth
Circuit, itself, has held that the Allen charge must include reference
to a juror's duty not to yield his conscientious convictions.'74
Even an instruction short of the one just described might satisfy
the adherents of the doctrine of jury nullification. An instruction ex-
plaining the meaning and consequence of a hung jury might have pro-
duced a different result in the recent Chicago Conspiracy trial.
According to two jurors in that case, if they had known the conse-
quences of a hung jury, they would not have compromised but would
have held out for acquittal. 75 Failure of the judge in a political case
properly to instruct on the meaning of a hung jury coerces a verdict
173. Id. at 759.
174. United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961).
175. Schultz, Like the Last Two People on the Face of the Earth, EVERG3EEN REV.
(Sept. 1970). The material disclosed in this article has been made the foundation of a
charge that Judge Hoffman improperly interfered with the deliberations of the jury. The
Seventh Circuit ordered a hearing on the matter and the results of that hearing are now
before the Seventh Circuit for decision.
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as surely as Judge Ford's special verdict instructions in the Spock case
did.
Thus, the right of jury nullification can be derived either from
democratic theory, from the jury's right to be instructed as to its proper
function, or from the defendant's right to trial by jury.
The force of the argument in favor of jury nullification is no-
where more stirring and clear than in the Moylan case, which involved
the trial of the Catonsville Nine for destroying draft files.170 At the
trial, defense attorney William Kunstler sought to awaken the same feel-
ings of conscience as had been aroused in the John Peter Zenger jury.
The judge stopped Kunstler's summation to remind him that jury nulli-
fication arguments were improper. Kunstler responded that he had only
sought to convey to the jury that they could make use of their con-
sciences in deciding the case and thus there was no violation of the
court's earlier order to forbear from urging the jury to nullify the
court's instructions on the law. After the jury retired, the judge let
some of the defendants address the bench. In the short excerpt which
follows, the essence of the debate crystallized:
Judge: You admitted that you went to Catonsville with a
purpose which requires your conviction. You wrote your purpose
down in advance. Your counsel stood and boasted of it. Now I hap-
pen to have a job in which I am bound by an oath of office.
Daniel Berrigan: Your honor, you spoke very movingly of
your understanding of what it is to be a judge. I wish to ask whether
or not reverence for the law does not also require a judge to inter-
pret and adjust the law to the needs of people here and now. I
believe that no tradition can remain a mere dead inheritance.
It is a living inheritance which we must continue to offer to the
living.
So it may be possible, even though the law excludes certain
important questions of conscience, to include them none the less;
and thereby, to bring the tradition to life again for the sake of the
people.
Judge: Well, I think there are two answers to that. You speak
to me as a man and as a judge. As a man, I would be a very funny
sort if I were not moved by your sincerity on the stand, and by
your views. I agree with you completely, as a person. We can never
176. See D. BEPRIGAN, THE TRUAL OF THE CATONSvIl.E NINE (1970).
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accomplish what we would like to accomplish, or give a better life
to people, if we are going to keep on spending so much money for
war. But a variety of circumstances makes it most difficult to have
your point of view presented. It is very unfortunate, but the issue
of the war cannot be presented as sharply as you would like. The
basic principle of our law is that we do things in an orderly fashion.
People cannot take the law into their own hands.
Daniel Berrigan: You are including our President in that
assertion.
Judge: Of course, the President must obey the law.
Thomas Lewis: He hasn't though.
Judge: If the President has not obeyed the law, there is very
little that can be done.
George Mische: And that is what this trial is all about. .... 177
CONCLUSION
The ability of our court system to deliver justice, or even the appear-
ance of justice, is coming under increasing attack by greater numbers
of people. Institutional and cultural biases in a supposedly neutral
structure,178 questionably ethical judicial practices which receive mass
media attention, widespread dissatisfaction with the substantive results
reached by many courts, unequal access to judicial forums by the dis-
enfranchised in our society, intensified use of the machinery of law by
the government to stifle vocal opposition, repressive sanctions placed
upon lawyers defending the poor, oppressed, or politically unpopu-
lar,170 increasing numbers of disrupted trials and more frequent dis-
respect for court officials, overzealous judicial use of the contempt
power,8 0 are all signposts pointing the way to a disintegration of the
legal process. In the words of William Kunstler:
... there is the disquieting thought that the legal subsystem itself
is nothing more than the new tyrant's most reliable weapon to ward
off any seemingly potent threat to the continuation of yesterday
177. Id. at 114-15.
178. See Swett, Cultural Bias in the American Legal System, 4 Lw & Soc. REV. 79
(1969); MINIMIzING RACISm IN JuRY TRIkLs (Ginger ed. 1970).
179. Comment, Controlling Lawyers By Bar Associations and Courts, 5 I-ARv. CIv.
RIGws-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 301 (1970): "It has become both professionally and legally dan-
gerous to be a lawyer representing the poor, minorities, and the politically unpopular."
180. See Freund, Contempt Power: Prevention, Not Retribution, TRAL MAGAzN 13
(Jan..Feb. 1971).
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into tomorrow. If the injunction and the conviction can achieve the
same results as the rope and sword, judges are, after all, far more
comfortable companions than executioners. And in the last analysis,
due process of law is exactly what the high and mighty say it is.181
The viability of the court system can only be maintained if the
court as an institution is accountable to the people under the tenets of
the democratic theory under which it was established. Preservation of
the right of trial by jury, and with it the right to nullify on the basis
of conscience in the name of the community, are essential to a restora-
tion of the vaunted stature the judicial system should occupy.
On a hot summer day in 1735, with all of New York and perhaps
most of the colonies attentive to a singular trial in New York, Andrew
Hamilton explained to the jury trying John Peter Zenger for seditious
libel that they had the historic and time-honored duty to nullify a sub-
servient judge's instructions and free an innocent victim of political
persecution. Hamilton told the jury that they need not fear tyranny
through force of arms because such might could never crush "a popu-
lar spirit of inquiry. The only way is to crush it down by a servile tri-
bunal. It is only by the abuse of the forms of justice that we can be
enslaved. An army never can do it."
Hamilton was allowed to urge the jury, in the face of the judge's
charge, ". ,. to see with their own eyes, to hear with'their own ears,
and to make use of their consciences and understanding in judging of
the lives, liberties or estates of their fellow subjects." And the jury
acquitted, refusing to be co-opted by a government asking them to de-
cide they had no right of freedom of expression '1 2 In the Zenger case
"political pressure produced a political trial, before judges who shared
the feelings of the ruling powers."'1 83 But in the Zenger case the jury
reaffirmed the central principle of democracy: popular control over
governmental institutions.18 4 As Thomas Jefferson noted 50 years later,
"What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not warned
from time to time that its people preserve the spirit of resistance?"'u8
181. Kunstler, In Defense of the Movement-The People's Lawyer, Julus DocroR
MAGAZiNE 4, 5 (Jan. 1971).
182. After the verdict was announced "[t]here were three huzzas in the hail, which
was crowded with people." At its next meeting the New York Common Council pre.
sented a medal to Andrew Hamilton for his "learned and generous defense of the rights
of mankind,"
183. I. BnANT, Ta- BuL OF RIcrrHs 181 (1965).
184. See Howe, supra note 34.
185. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens, Nov. 13, 1787.
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JURY NULLIFICATION
There are great tensions in our society. The debate over lawful
means for social change as against the use of violence for structuring
revision of social institutions has escalated to a fearful plane, Accord-
ing to Justice William 0. Douglas, only two choices exist for us: "A
police state in which all dissent is suppressed or rigidly controlled; or a
society where law is responsive to human needs." 186 Jury nullification
represents one channel for making laws accountable to the people they
serve.
It is time for us to come to terms with our own contemporary
version of the seditious libel problem, and recognize, as our forbears
did, that it will sometimes be necessary to protest an unjust law by
violating it and putting the question of justification to one's fellow
citizens. It is not at all obvious to them, as it apparently is to many
of our contemporaries, that one had all the protection one might
need in petitioning the legislature to repeal a law, or asking a judge
to make a ruling of invalidity. They thought resistance and nulli-
fication were tools that would sometimes have to be used to per-
suade a captious government that it was misguided. Our fellow
citizens who think a resistance movement is the resort only of
anarchists ought to listen to Theophilus Parsons, speaking to the
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention in 1788:
Let him be considered as a criminal by the general govern-
ment, yet only his fellow-citizens can convict him; they are
his jury, and if they pronounce him innocent, not all the
powers of Congress can hurt him; and innocent they cer-
tainly will pronounce him if the supposed law he resisted
was an act of usurpation.
Those who think resisters are tearing at the fabric of the society
might wish to consider the possibility that a society is best able to
survive if it permits a means for taking an issue back to the public
over the heads of public officialdom when it recognizes that a govern-
ment may have so implicated itself in a wretched policy that it
needs to be extricated by popular repudiation in a forum more
immediately available-and less politically comprised-than a bal-
lot box.1 87
Restoration of the full dignity of the doctrine of jury nullification
will not eliminate this country's problems. But it may give more people
both the confidence that those problems can be solved, and a means to
186. W. DOUGLAS, Poms oF REBLLON 92 (1969).
187. Sax, supra note 33.
1972]
HeinOnline  -- 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 225 1972
226 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
help achieve some solution themselves. 18 And that is the essence of a
democracy.
188. I do not believe that jury nullification will always be beneficial, nor that the
jury will always make what I would consider to be the correct judgment. During the
Chicago Conspiracy trial, seven policemen were tried for their conduct during the dem-
onstrations held at the time of the Democratic Convention. All were acquitted. U.S.
Attorney Richard Schultz said "The people who sit on juries in this city are just not
ready to convict a Chicago policeman." J. LuKAs, TrE BARNYARD EPrrnTz AND OTIIER OB-
SCENrrxzs 103 (1970). If this conclusion is valid, and under the circumstances it appears
to be so, then jury nullification has provided a societal input into the legal system which
conveys important and useful information about how prosecutorial discretion should be
exercised. If the substantive result seems to be deplorable, the answer lies not with more
prosecutions, but rather with greater social education about legal rights and unlawful
official conduct.
Despite the possibility of less than noble use of the jury right, jury nullification is
an improvement over what we have now and it is the only view which is faithful to the
history and purpose of the concept of the jury as "the lamp that shows that freedom
lives." DEVLIN, supra note 60, at 164.
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